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CIVIL WARS, INSECURITY, AND  
INTERVENTION

Edited by Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder

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## *Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War*

*Susan L. Woodward*

The United Nations can only help parties to conflict to make peace if they cooperate in the process. If parties are determined to fight, it is impossible for the United Nations to stop them.

Thorwald Stoltenberg, United Nations Co-Chairman of the  
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

If the parties don't want peace, we can't bring it to them.

General John Shalikashvili, Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Armed Forces

On December 20, 1995, a NATO-led, sixty thousand-strong intervention force from thirty-four countries, including all sixteen NATO allies, entered the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist in implementing a "general framework agreement for peace" negotiated the previous month under American auspices. Designed to end a brutal civil war lasting three and one half years between three former coalition parties and their foreign supporters over the fate of the republic and the three parties' claims to the right of self-determination when Yugoslavia dissolved, the framework was the eighth consecutive plan proposed by third-party negotiations to end the Bosnian war.<sup>1</sup> Although the talks producing this agreement were the result of whirlwind shuttle diplomacy by American diplomats in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, but also in the neighboring states supporting two of the three parties, Belgrade (Serbia) and Zagreb (Croatia),

and then in proximity talks between those three parties (one of the Bosnian three and the two external patrons of the other two), and the framework was widely seen to be little more than a cease-fire, its premise was that it would only work if the agreement represented the mutual interest of the three Bosnian parties to cooperate in building a new state and peace. What distinguished this plan from the other eight, and led to high hopes for its success, was the willingness for the first time of the United States to contribute ground troops to an international force helping to implement these "Dayton accords."

The Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed on a twelve-month mandate, from December 20, 1995, to December 20, 1996. Convinced that peace was not yet self-sustaining, NATO powers then sent a second deployment, a Stabilization Force (SFOR) of thirty-five thousand for another eighteen months. But that too appeared insufficient time by the fall of 1997, when military and civilian assessments were nearly unanimous that war would resume in Bosnia if the soldiers pulled out in June 1998, and NATO and American leaders decided that a third deployment would be necessary. It is therefore too soon to judge the role of third-party intervention in helping to bring a definitive end to the Bosnian war.

What the Bosnian case does suggest, thus far, is that the framework of the security dilemma is useful, in understanding both the deterioration in relations that led to war and the difficulties in translating a cease-fire agreement into a lasting peace. It also suggests, however, that the willingness of outsiders to send in troops to help break the security dilemma by reestablishing a secure environment is not sufficient if the negotiated agreement itself does not address the security fears of the population and the structural conditions that can create a security dilemma. If the outsiders who assist in ending the parties' civil war do not understand the security dilemma, or are unwilling to see it operating in the particular case, they can even intensify the security dilemma and prolong the perceptions of vulnerability that inhibit cooperation.<sup>2</sup> In part this lack of understanding can result from a misunderstanding of the difference between interstate and internal wars. Although useful analytically, the framework of the security dilemma cannot be transferred directly without refinements—the Bosnian case demonstrates—from its origins in an interstate context to the circumstances defining internal wars.

## The Bosnian War

There would have been no war in Bosnia and Herzegovina if Yugoslavia had not first collapsed. Four years before the talks at Dayton, between June and December 1991, two of the of six republics in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia, declared their independence, and left the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina without a country. While politicians and citizens in the rest of the country had to adjust to this situation created by the secessions—would they try to create a smaller Yugoslavia, go their separate ways as four more independent states, or redraw borders in the remaining territory to create states more in line with national identities?—Western powers were also taking decisions, for example, that Slovenia and Croatia would be granted international recognition on the basis of the right to national self-determination but that the internal borders of the federal republics were henceforth the legitimate *international* borders of independent states. While this sounds simple enough, the problem with Bosnia and Herzegovina is that it was constituted in the Yugoslav system as the home of not one but three constitutionally recognized nations—Croats, Muslims, and Serbs.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the Bosnian identity on which a new state would be based had been created by and for the post-World War II Yugoslav system: as a buffer to those in Croatia and in Serbia who claimed Bosnia as part of their national patrimony and as a federal unit to create, on the basis of size, a balance of power among the six units, as the beneficiary of the socialist leadership's commitment to national equality, and as the geographic center and physical repository—the "Dinaric Fortress"—of the country's independent national defense strategy. Could a common Bosnian identity, despite its venerable pre-Yugoslav origins, survive the collapse and delegitimation of that system when nationalist parties were winning in the north?

In January 1990 the ruling Yugoslav communist party—holding an extraordinary congress to address the political crisis—simply collapsed when its republican leaders could not agree and the Slovene delegation walked out. Multiparty elections for republican-level governments were held in each of the six republics, beginning in April in Slovenia and Croatia. The Bosnian electorate had less than one year, between the declarations in July of the intent to pursue independence and their elections in November, to reorient political identity and allegiance away from Titoism and Yugoslav socialism. Although the federal prime minister's reform party drew the largest votes of any republic and the renamed, former communist party held its own well, the majority of the electorate voted their individual national identities in



MAP 3.1. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
Source: Brookings Institution Press.

what was largely <sup>vote</sup> defensive positioning: "If my neighbors vote for a national party to which I don't belong, I had better vote mine." Political parties representing them as Muslims, Serbs, or Croats formed the parliamentary majority, and the largest of each formed a tripartite governing coalition, similar to the power-sharing formula of federal Yugoslavia, and proceeded to parcel out ministries, benefits, and jobs to their supporters proportionately.<sup>4</sup> Municipal and village governments, by contrast, tended toward majority rule by the party representing the largest national group locally.

But when it came to deciding the political fate of the republic itself and how to guarantee the former rights of each to self-determination when the umbrella that provided them mutual guarantees—the state of Yugoslavia— was disintegrating, no agreement could be reached. The dispute escalated rapidly, under the time pressure of external events. From tripartite collaboration in ruling Bosnia, politicians moved to bargaining over mutually incompatible preferences, accompanied by defensive mobilization for war and efforts to freeze out the opposition parties and civic groups fighting to prevent nationalist division and war, and then—when Alija Izetbegović, the chairman of the seven-person presidency and president of the SDA, declared Bosnian independence on March 4, 1992—to a three-sided civil war. time

The choices facing the republic's politicians in 1991 were three: (1) to remain part of a new reduced Yugoslavia along with Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, (2) to become an independent multinational state, or (3) to imitate the dissolution along national lines begun by Slovenia and Croatia. In the third choice Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs would "secede" from Bosnia and Herzegovina and join up with co-nationals in neighboring Serbia and Croatia, changing the internal borders of federal Yugoslavia to accommodate a concept of nation-states, and Bosnian Muslims would in turn create their own nation-state in the territory that remained or in common with other Slavic-speaking Muslims in the former country.<sup>5</sup>

The first option was favored by Germany, which had pushed the European Community (EC) momentum toward recognizing Slovenia and Croatia, but Alija Izetbegović, representing both Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian republic, rejected this option as early as November 1990.<sup>6</sup> The second option appealed to EC foreign ministers, in their attempt to dissolve Yugoslavia into its component federal republics so as not to change existing (internal) borders. To facilitate this choice, the EC began negotiations with the leaders of the three coalition partners on the internal political arrangements of an independent Bosnia and required them to hold a referendum of voters on independence. But the leaders of the Muslim and Croat parties had



## The Security Dilemma and Causes of War

Two explanations for the Bosnian war competed for attention in the myriad efforts by outsiders to stop the war. One was a thesis of ancient ethnic hatreds repressed by the communist regime. The death in 1980 of long-ruling dictator Josip Broz Tito, and the collapse in 1989–90 of communist regimes in the east were said to have removed the lid of repression and restraints of the cold war.<sup>7</sup> One version cited a historical conflict between Serbs and Croats that had led to war in Croatia in 1991 and also motivated the presidents of the republics of Croatia and Serbia to plan to divide Bosnia between them, with Muslims trapped in between. Another version saw these hatreds as internal to Bosnia, arguing that its three peoples had never been at peace except when an external force kept them from civil war.

The second explanation for war was predatory leaders who used nationalism and war to deflect attention from needed economic and political reforms that threatened their basis of power and political position.<sup>8</sup> Although there were several candidates for this explanation, all focused on the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, because it was Serbs in Croatia (though fewer than one-third of them) and Serbs in Bosnia (though Croats as well) who took up arms against the peaceful secession of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. But when Milošević is said to have planned the two wars by inciting the Serbs to rebel and sending them aid in order to fulfill a nineteenth-century dream of Serb nationalists to create a Greater Serbia by expanding the borders of the Serbian federal republic, the argument becomes confused—melding, on the one hand, with this first thesis of historical conflicts, and on the other hand, with a nationalist argument attributing expansionism to Serbs *as a people*.<sup>9</sup>

The factual evidence for both these hypotheses is slim. While the collapse of Yugoslavia was an extremely complex process, its *dynamic*, and thus an analysis of its causes, can actually be captured usefully by the concept of a security dilemma and its spiraling behavior. Although the Yugoslav federal government continued to function up to the end in the second half of 1991, its authority and especially its enforcement power had declined so much during the 1980s (under the attack of republican politicians unwilling to compromise their autonomy and economic power for a common reform of the federal government, the budgetary strictures and financial-system reform requirements of an IMF debt-repayment program to stabilize the currency and create a market economy, and quarrels over political reforms that would provide the legal basis for a such an economy and a postsocialist democratic

government) that the context of its dissolution could be said to resemble the conditions of anarchy in which a security dilemma in international relations is said to occur. Politicians in each republic jockeyed for republican (state) gains in the contest over economic and political reform and justified their fight in terms of “national” interests and rights, and they increasingly rejected or ignored federal authority in their republics such that the situation became increasingly anarchic. Federal politicians had no enforcement power if the republican leaders did not themselves consent. These leaders did not represent independent states seeking security, but in seeking to satisfy the interests of their republic and their own power by using the argument of national rights—and in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, building up separate armies to defend a fight for independence—they approximated the behavior associated by realists with the international system where information failures (and deliberate distortion), declining trust and credibility, and escalating armament (by individuals, localities, paramilitaries, and eventually separate armies) make cooperation on a mutually agreed outcome ever more difficult to achieve.

The structural condition associated with generating a security dilemma was reinforced by several particularities of the domestic Yugoslav (and subsequently Bosnian) scenes. First, the prewar Yugoslav system emphasized *rights* more than interests. But these rights were guaranteed by the overarching institutions of the federal government, in which each group could feel safe in its rights without denying rights to others. When the system’s political contract of national equality and individual welfare could no longer be supported financially or normatively under the budgetary austerities of macro-economic stabilization, debt repayment, and economic reform in the 1980s, then political nationalism began to take an exclusionary form. Individuals and politicians first claimed social and economic rights for their national group against others, as they faced worsening unemployment, frozen wages, and declining welfare funds, and then escalated those claims to political rights over capital assets and territory in moves toward exclusive states’ rights for the republics, in the name of their majority nation instead of equality and, eventually, independence. The apparently zero-sum character of the economic and constitutional conflicts made it even more difficult to arrive at cooperative solutions when the overarching institutions began to succumb to the republics’ increasing refusal to recognize federal authority whenever they saw it to be against their own interests.

Second, while the politicians’ claims for states’ rights were made in terms of the constitutionally guaranteed right to *national* self-determination, set-

tlement patterns did not conform. These claims made the many people in each republic who were not of the majority national group feel vulnerable, in some cases as a result of real discrimination by public authorities. The lack of congruence between national identity and republican borders raised doubts about the stability of borders and created uncertainty for all those who lived in mixed communities, such as border areas in Croatia and much of central and eastern Bosnia, about fundamental rights of citizenship and political loyalty. This was particularly strong where people who did not belong to the majority nation in a republic held a local majority and could thus contemplate and demand autonomy or even a change of borders where they concentrated territorially. Most important, all national groups in Yugoslavia were numerically minorities. Nationalist calls for majority rule for *their* national group, in the context of a federal government increasingly unable to enforce legal protections of national equality, translated directly into fears of becoming a minority after four decades of entitlement to equal treatment and governmental protection.

Nowhere was this more acute than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Muslims formed a plurality (43.7 percent in 1991, up from 39.5 percent in 1981); Serbs had been a plurality of 42.8 percent in 1961 but had declined in proportion by 1991 to one-third (31.4 percent, but about 40 percent, if one adds the many Serbs who identified as "Yugoslavs" in 1991 and had to choose an ethnic identity when Yugoslavia ended), and Croats were only 17.3 percent. But within the context of Yugoslavia, Muslims were a small minority (a countrywide total of 10 percent in 1991). Rhetorical support from Croatia and Serbia to Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs was enough to make Muslims feel a truly vulnerable minority, whereas Muslim politicians' insistence on an integral and independent Bosnia, in which Croats and Serbs would become a minority, made the latter two groups feel truly vulnerable.

Third, the resources held by each group were different, which enhanced each group's perceptions of being a minority at risk. Unlike the oft-cited, and misunderstood, nonviolent breakup of Czechoslovakia, in which the Czechs held dominant economic wealth, political power, and international support, in Yugoslavia the resources of economic wealth, political power, armaments, and international patrons were spread unequally among regions and groups and with insufficient cumulative impact to make one group clearly stronger or weaker. People also tended to perceive the resources of others—such as economic power over government policy, international patrons, demographic increase, or government jobs in the police or army—as

more threatening (in the language of the security dilemma, more "offensively capable") than their own.

Fourth, despite the realist's argument that the international system is anarchic, the cold war was an international regime with norms, rules, and legitimate authorities that directly shaped the identity, interests, and power of Yugoslavia and imposed constraints that had a stabilizing result. When that international regime began to collapse, between 1985 and 1989, Yugoslavia found itself in a truly anarchic situation with all the uncertainty about its existence, its identity, and its access to finance, trading partners, and military alliances possible. When the republics stopped accepting the federal government as final arbiter in domestic competition for rights and privileges, the efforts of the international community to provide a substitute arbiter through mediation, beginning in June-July 1991 with the EC and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), did nothing to reduce that external uncertainty or to facilitate communication that could vitiate the perception of zero-sum choices and defensive positioning between Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and the federal authorities (especially the army).

Finally, one might also add, although this effect is difficult to calculate, that the insecurities engendered by economic decline, particularly for the middle strata whose standards of living had risen consistently for almost thirty years, might have been exacerbated by a social organization that emphasized individualized rather than collective means of improving one's prospects and living standards, by a culture of distrust, grown in the soil of peasant society, a *longue durée* of externally imposed uncertainty, and arbitrary rule, and by localized systems of information (radio, TV, newspapers, and journals revolved within republics and regions, in contrast to political networks, which spanned the country).

It is in this structural context that the role of politicians becomes critical, not because they were attempting to gain or hold onto power, as all politicians do, but because of the arguments they chose to legitimize that power and their claims in the constitutional and economic conflicts of the 1980s. The politicians' rhetoric of national rights and loyalties centered on *survival*, arguing that the fate of the individual depended on the fate of the group, that the relevant group was the nation because it held rights to sovereignty, and that the role of the group for the individual and of the politician for the group was *protection*. Politicians in the wealthier republics began with the argument that their nation was being exploited economically by others, through the system of taxes and transfers underlying social equality and



regional development, and that individuals' rights and well-being were best protected by national leaders.<sup>10</sup> Those whose population was declining numerically aroused fears about the loss of cultural identity through assimilation of a larger group. Political rhetoric claiming national groups to be *endangered* (*ugrožen*) by other national groups or leaders gave permission to individual acts of discrimination and harassment that governments, in the fever of political transition and first-time democratic election and campaigning, were particularly careless about prosecuting. Eventually politicians even resorted to warnings about the danger of *genocide* against their people—to mobilize supporters and loyalty through the political capital of revived memories of World War II and to invoke the collective obligation to solidarity of all who identified with that nation throughout the country.<sup>11</sup>

The months leading to war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were filled with threats and counterthreats by the leaders of the three nationalist parties ruling the republic, each maneuvering toward a political outcome from the perspective of national sovereignty. As Bougarel writes, the "conflict resulted less from a unilateral act of aggression than from a spiral of verbal, institutional, and physical violence."<sup>12</sup> The success of such rhetoric depends on credibility, however, and this was a result not of personal or group antagonisms in Bosnia but of the growing political uncertainty about the fate of the country after July 1990, when the governments elected in Slovenia and Croatia announced their intentions to pursue independence and when Serbian leaders including President Milošević responded by calling for new borders to include all Serbs in a Serbian state. In mid-1990 the Bosnian population "pronounced itself 74 per cent in favour of a ban on nationally or confessionally based parties," but "six months later, vote[d] in the same proportion for precisely such parties."<sup>13</sup>

The spiral had begun, according to Bougarel, with this breakdown of the political conception of Bosnian society, which was rapidly followed, according to a "deep logic of Bosnian society, reminiscent of the sociological theories of the 'prisoner's dilemma' and the 'self-fulfilling prophecy,'" by a breakdown in the "everyday conception of community relations."

The practice of *komšilik* (the culture of good neighborliness) . . . represents not so much abstract tolerance or social interaction, as a permanent guarantee of the pacific nature of relations between the communities, and thus of the security of each of them. If political developments place a question-mark over this pacific nature, each community will seek to ensure its security through communitarian

mobilisation and isolation, tending in this way to reinforce the general feeling of insecurity and precipitate breakdown in the codes of *komšilik*.<sup>14</sup>

Leaders of the nationalist parties actually collaborated to persuade voters that their security depended on voting their national identity (or making a choice in the many cases of mixed identity) and even to vote for another nation's party rather than to give their vote to a non-nationalist party. The turning point cited by most Bosnian citizens, however, comes much later, at the moment when guns appeared in the hands of neighbors, shooting was heard in the village or armed thugs in various uniforms knocked down the door, or snipers and mortars took deadly aim at urban crowds of civilians. Seeking protection for their physical selves where they could, some fled, as families or as whole villages; others looked to neighbors, finding aid unpredictably and independent of ethnic loyalties; others armed or joined militias or armies. As social anthropologist Tone Bringa shows in her award-winning video documentary, *We Are All Neighbors*, the cohesion of *komšilik* in a mixed Muslim-Croat village northwest of Sarajevo lasted long into the war. There the disappearance of neighborliness and the reluctant flight of its Muslim inhabitants occur practically overnight when an artillery gun of the HVO (Bosnian Croat army) simply appears on the hill overlooking the village. Moreover, for almost a year before the war began, petty arms dealers were having a field day in the growing sense of insecurity. A Bosnian journalist writes:

In downtown Sarajevo, in front of the Grand Hotel Europa, petty thieves and smugglers offered pistols, small-caliber sniper rifles, Kalashnikovs, and bazookas. The dealing went on freely, as though potatoes and not guns were being traded. In the more conservative heartland the strategy was the following. In a village populated by a Serb majority the arms dealer would gather a group of better-off men, and would warn them he had information that the Muslims of a neighboring village were preparing to attack. He would then offer arms for self-defense. The story would spread rapidly through the village. Not knowing what to believe, people would come to check out the sale. Seeing others buy, they would buy themselves. It seemed imprudent not to. Often, all arms would be gone in a day. The dealer would then move on to the neighboring, predominantly Muslim village, telling

the same story, this time about the Serbs preparing the attack. Many people were borrowing money or selling livestock to buy a gun.<sup>15</sup>

The day before European recognition of Bosnian independence, the Bosnian presidency received a report estimating 600,000 armed persons in a republic of 4.4 million, in addition to the official stockpiles, armaments factories, and military installations of Yugoslavia's system of all-national defense.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, those who argue that there was no security dilemma in the run up to violence in Croatia and in Bosnia because this is a structural argument that ignores agency and thus denies leaders' culpability for *manufacturing* fears and defensiveness miss the point of the security dilemma: that it is perceptions that matter, and that it is a relational dynamic between two or more actors that leads to violence.<sup>17</sup> For example, to understand the fears and defensive positioning that led Bosnian Serb leaders to abandon political negotiations and shift to war in April 1992 does not excuse them from the consequences of that decision. But the context of that preemptive strike, based on warnings and fears fully broadcast in advance, includes (1) President Izetbegović's defection the previous October and December from the constitutional obligation that all three nations reach consensus; (2) the decision of the United States to reenter the conflict in support of President Izetbegović's request for immediate recognition and of the EU decision to ignore Bosnian constitutionality and the explicit warnings of the EU's Arbitration Commission when most Serbs boycotted the referendum; and (3) the March exodus of the Yugoslav federal army from Croatia, where they had been protecting Serbs in border areas (and by implication in Bosnia), to be replaced by United Nations peacekeepers monitoring a cease-fire agreement. Actions provoke reactions, particularly when each side is thinking defensively, is perceived by others to be acting aggressively, and there is no external authority or arbiter to reverse the spiral.

As for the explanation of ancient ethnic hatreds, the context of the Yugoslav conflict, as it moved from Slovenia to Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina and drew in outside powers such as Germany, appeared to many to imitate World War II. Those who first perceived themselves at risk as minorities in nationalizing states—Serbs in Croatia and in northern Bosnia, as well as many officers in the Yugoslav army from these regions—had memories of genocidal victimization at the hands of fascists in Croatia and Bosnia during that war, which contributed powerfully to the credibility of politicians and arms dealers who told them they were at risk again. As de Figueiredo and

Weingast argue, hate-mongering or fear-inciting leaders must have material to work with. In 1990–91 this included the rhetoric of nationalist politicians and actual acts of discrimination that helped confirm the groups' worst fears.

By not understanding this dynamic interaction between leaders and between leaders and followers in causing the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, outsiders missed many opportunities to prevent war and even helped to exacerbate the conflict and prolong the Bosnian war.<sup>18</sup> The same understanding applies to the effort to bringing the Bosnian war to an end, when both manufactured and justified fears for physical safety, loss of identity, and lack of protection in the future were no longer a matter of political rhetoric and historical memory but immediate experience.

Critical to an evaluation of third-party efforts to end the Bosnian war was the belief of the chief external negotiators of the Dayton framework for peace that the Bosnian war was not caused, even in part, by a security dilemma. Although interpretations varied substantially among different commanders of the international military force sent to implement the military aspects of the accords, the American principals did little to hide their conviction that the war was caused by Serbian aggression under direction from the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, aimed at carving up Bosnia to create a Greater Serbia and carried out by Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, they rejected the argument of ancient ethnic hatreds, seeing a common interest among the vast majority of Bosnians in ending the war and a legacy of multiethnic coexistence and cooperation that could resume once predatory leaders were removed from the scene.

As the epigraphs to this chapter reveal, however, such an international undertaking may even have to assume the possibility of cooperation among former warring peoples. The question is whether the settlement and the actions of these outsiders to assist its implementation are designed to remove the obstacles to cooperation or are based on the wrong assumption and make those obstacles worse instead.

### The Settlement and the Security Dilemma

The Dayton accords—negotiated in Ohio by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia and signed by them at Paris on December 14 along with representatives of the United States, Britain, France, and the European Union—committed them all to the second option of 1991, which had been adopted in spring 1992 by the international community: the "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the same time, the accords built on two cease-fire agreements, both also a result of American diplomatic initiative, which effectively recognized the political intentions and military power of the three parties who had gone to war. The first, signed in Washington in March 1994, aimed to stop the war between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats by creating a federation of two equal parties and a military alliance directed against the Serbs—restoring, in other words, the parliamentary alliance of October-December 1991 and the military alliance of June 1992. The second cease-fire covered the entire country, agreed upon in two installments by representatives of Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia between September 14 and October 5, and effective October 10, 1995, and only after a NATO bombing campaign and a joint Croatian- and Bosnian-army (primarily Muslims) ground campaign in August and September had pushed Serb forces from 35 percent of the land they then held. The November political agreement obliged the three party-armies to translate their cease-fires into peace and to work together to create a single state. No borders could be changed, and no secession permitted.

The result of the war, however, had been the division of Bosnian territory and its population into three separately governed and nearly ethnically pure areas. More than half the population had become refugees in neighboring Yugoslavia and Croatia or farther afield (the large majority were in Germany, many others in Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria). The half remaining in Bosnia were in areas controlled by their national majority—an uneasy co-existence between original inhabitants and persons expelled from other parts of the republic or from neighboring Croatia, squatting in abandoned homes or in holding centers run by international humanitarian agencies, who had little in common except their declared national identity and being alive.

The Dayton framework addressed this contradiction between goal and reality by combining elements of each party's objectives. In compensation to the two parties whose war aims were denied, the country would be divided, as the cease-fire agreements set, between two substantially self-governing entities—a Bosnian Muslim-Bosnian Croat Federation and a Serb Republic. They would be linked into one state with a weak central government and power-sharing arrangements between the three national groups. At the same time, the negotiators took a stand against the forced resettlement of the population and insisted, in a policy aimed at reversing the "ethnic cleansing" of the war, that all persons have the right to return to their prewar homes.

Eleven annexes to the general framework set out the tasks and obligations of the parties and the commitment of the international community to assist

in abolishing military confrontation lines and restoring countrywide freedom of movement, establishing common political and economic institutions, facilitating a restoration of the prewar multiethnic settlement pattern, and cooperating with an international tribunal (set up at The Hague in October 1993) to judge culpability for war crimes.

Behind the accords lie a number of heroic assumptions that are compatible with the logic of the security dilemma and its role in civil war termination: (1) that the signatures on the accord were sincere, representing a binding agreement among the parties to cooperate and accept the peace agreement as their own; (2) that the Bosnian population (both soldiers and civilians of all three national communities) were largely unwilling participants in the war, victims of their leaders' extremist nationalism and fear-mongering; (3) that the indictment of leaders held responsible for the population displacements (called ethnic cleansing) as war criminals and their removal from Bosnia to be tried in The Hague would eliminate the primary obstacles to elite-level cooperation in building a postwar state and to mass reintegration; and (4) that a twelve-month foreign military presence replacing the warring armies with a "secure environment" would free citizens from their security fears and vulnerabilities to return to former neighborhoods, reestablish old friendships, and rediscover mutual interests in peace and commerce. The design of the accords also directly addressed the structural conditions that can give rise to a security dilemma and to individuals' fears at three levels: military demobilization, territorial sovereignty, and an authoritative government.

### *Military Demobilization*

The first task—laid out in a carefully crafted, detailed annex (1-A) on the military aspects of the peace settlement—was to separate armies and begin their demobilization. The United Nations Security Council agreed to authorize, and NATO to organize and command, a multinational military implementation force (IFOR) to assist in this task, thus providing the reassurance needed in the vulnerable period between cease-fire and peace. Heavily armed, with robust rules of engagement, IFOR was deployed throughout the country, with particular attention to the interentity boundary line between the federation and Serb republic that had become the final military confrontation line. It was to supervise the withdrawal of armed forces behind a four mile zone of separation, the cantonment of all heavy weapons, and the demobilization of more than half those under arms. As confidence-

and security-building measures between former enemies, IFOR also convened and chaired joint local and countrywide military commissions in which army officers met frequently to share information, inspections, and future plans on military holdings, exercises, and movements.

NATO officials followed a strict timetable for the separation of forces and within six months had moved on to the task of consolidating the peace, by destroying unreported caches of weapons as soon as they were found, stopping unauthorized movement of tanks, artillery, and aircraft, and ordering police carrying more than the allowed number of sidearms, rifles, and ammunition to hand them over. They were also tasked to monitor compliance with an arms control agreement negotiated with the parties in Vienna in June 1996. After the initial twelve months, a second deployment about half the size of IFOR—a Stabilization Force (SFOR)—extended the international military presence an additional eighteen months to continue to provide the stabilizing “security environment” for the other tasks and actors in the peace process and for the continued cooperation in sharing information among officers of the three armies. At the end of that eighteen months yet another NATO mandate to prolong the SFOR presence was agreed upon, one that replaced the previous time limits with six-monthly reviews assessing progress toward a “sustainable peace.”

### *Territorial Sovereignty*

The theory of the security dilemma assumes that borders are given and a government exists. Neither were true for Bosnia. In addition to these classic peacekeeping tasks of military separation, demobilization, and confidence building, which security dilemma theorists consider the core of civil war termination, peace would not emerge if the uncertainty regarding the sanctity of Bosnia's borders and that resulting from the absence of a functioning government were not also substantially reduced. These two additional layers of security, in fact, are related in cases of ethnonationalist conflict. Clearly, as Fen Hampson argues from his comparative study, “the success of a peace settlement is inextricably tied to the interests of neighboring regional powers and their overall commitment to the peace process. Where such a commitment is lacking, the risk of failure is higher.”<sup>19</sup> In addition to neighbors' respect for a country's borders, however, studies of ethnic tolerance within a country demonstrate a direct relation between individuals' perceptions that their country's borders are secure or threatened and their levels of ethnic tolerance or intolerance toward groups of the same ethnicity as neighbors who are potential threats.<sup>20</sup> The success of the United Nations military de-

ployment to the northern and western borders of Macedonia in preventing its descent into war along with Bosnia in 1992–97, although attributed to its role as a trip wire against Serbian aggression from the north, was clearly its contribution to internal stability at a time when the republic's independence had not yet been recognized internationally and was actively challenged by neighboring Greece. According to Macedonian officials, the greatest effect of the border deployment was to calm domestic tensions that might well have spiraled into interethnic violence.

It is not necessary to argue that the Bosnian war was an act of aggression from Serbia or Croatia aimed at carving up Bosnia to create a greater Serbia or a greater Croatia in order to see that their military and supply support to Bosnian co-nationals fighting for national self-determination (whether as territorial autonomy in Bosnia or secession to join Serbia and Croatia) was sufficient to evoke a defensive response from Bosnian Muslims. At the same time, the preemptive recognition of Bosnian independence by the EU and the United States exacerbated the fears of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats about what it would mean to be subordinate to a Bosnian Muslim majority in an independent Bosnia. Bosnian Muslim leaders responded that their only means of survival as a nation after the breakup of Yugoslavia was their own state. The wartime destruction of their physical and cultural presence (through population expulsions, rape, or murder, razing of mosques, burning of libraries and cultural monuments, and so forth) in areas claimed by Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, considered by many to be a genocide, certainly gave credibility to this claim.

To break the spiral of these mutual perceptions of threat and very real danger, the Dayton negotiators insisted that the presidents of Croatia and Serbia be party to the talks and cosignators on the agreement, committing them to Bosnian sovereignty within its prewar borders. Of the three Bosnian parties, they invited only the Bosnian Muslim leader, President Izetbegović to represent the undivided sovereignty of Bosnia and to sign for all its citizens. Although some parts of the accord were also submitted to the Bosnian Croat leader, Krešimir Zubak, he signed as president of the Bosnian Muslim–Bosnian Croat Federation, and the proximity talks would not begin until the Bosnian Serbs had signed over their authority to negotiate and commit to the president of Serbia. International commitment came in the signatures of the presidents of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, and the head of the European Union.

In addition to this personal commitment to Bosnian borders, the accords contained provisions for arms control between the three states—Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).<sup>21</sup> This second military annex,

1-B, on "regional stabilization," prescribed negotiations on regional confidence- and security-building measures, a subregional arms control regime of military balance of equipment and forces, calculated in proportion to population on the ratio 5:2:2 for Yugoslavia: Croatia: Bosnia, and a regional arms control agreement under the auspices and force-reduction principles of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE also accepted responsibility for subsequent supervision and monitoring of the negotiated limits. All military forces of foreign origin in Bosnia at the time of the peace agreement (not only those from neighboring states but especially "advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel" from Islamic states and groups assisting Bosnian Muslims) were required to leave, with their equipment, within thirty days of the signing at Paris.

Nonetheless, NATO commanders refused the request of the Bosnian Muslim leadership (made repeatedly since six months before the war began) to deploy forces on the external borders against foreign threats. Priority remained on ending the internal hostilities and preventing their resumption at potential hotspots within the country. The task of the military deployment was to assist the Bosnian parties in restoring cooperation, ignoring the role that certainty about the border plays in internal conflict and uncertainty.

### *Authoritative Government*

The third structural condition inducing uncertainty that needed remedy was the absence of a common government, economic system, and institutions to enforce, sanction, and monitor individual rights. The Dayton accords actually contain a constitution aimed at reassuring members of all three communities that they would not be endangered minorities and could safely shift from fighting to political activity. The right of national self-determination is institutionalized by power-sharing arrangements for all government offices the three communities held in common, substantial devolution of power and jurisdiction (including defense) away from the central government to the two entities—the Federation and Republika Srpska, a federation further subdivided into ten cantons (three Croat-majority, five Muslim-majority, and two "mixed" in which Croats and Muslims share power), and a political system based on representation and rights according to national identity and ethnic subdivisions. The presidency is a committee of three, one for each of the three nations, with a rotating chair. The upper house of the State parliament has five Bosniacs, five Croats, and five Serbs; although the lower house does not specify national qualifications, its mem-

bership is elected proportionally "within their respective entity," meaning one-third from each of the three nations. International administrators even went further, in making appointments to official commissions for the transitional period, by reaching for "a Bosniac, a Croat, and a Serb" to make decisions on elections, human rights, displaced persons and refugees, national monuments, transportation, and public corporations. Citizens can choose their residence freely and vote accordingly, but they can only be elected to the presidency and upper house in the territory identified with "their" national identity. Even voting rules and decision-making procedures were written into the constitution to guard against what was apparently seen as the greatest danger to citizens—the possible tyranny of one national group over another.<sup>22</sup> For example, the parliament can only take decisions by qualified majority. Any one of its three constituent nations can choose to define an issue in its vital interests, block proceedings by abstention, and return to its provincial assembly for a vote, followed by a vote in parliament requiring a majority of each nation (and two-thirds if the decision at issue was made by the presidency) and tallied by entity (and by nation within the federal entity). Citizenship is held within the entity, although the Bosnian government adopted an overall law on citizenship and can also issue papers, and special relations can be established between the Bosniac-Bosnian Croat Federation and neighboring Croatia, to reassure Bosnian Croats, and between the Republika Srpska and neighboring Yugoslavia, to reassure Bosnian Serbs.<sup>23</sup>

It was particularly important to the American contingent in the international operation that a postwar government be elected as soon as possible. They saw a functioning government as taking over the provision of internal security once the separation of forces had taken place, and so the Dayton accords required elections within ten months. Although widely criticized by human rights groups, commentators, and even by the secretary general of the organization responsible for organizing the entire election process and supervising the elections, the OSCE, who said it was too soon to guarantee conditions for free and fair elections, the American heading the OSCE mission in Bosnia insisted they be held on September 14, 1996, for all-Bosnian, entity-level, and cantonal (in the federation) presidents and legislatures. Only at the last minute did he decide that conditions were too insecure to proceed with municipal elections. The international officials coordinating implementation of the nonmilitary aspects of the peace agreement (the Office of the High Representative [OHR]) also compiled a "quick-start package" (QSP) listing all of the offices, committees, agencies, and

commissions that would have to be created and filled by the newly elected governments as well as drafts of all major legislation necessary to establish common institutions, such as a central bank, a common currency, and harmonized customs and tax laws. After almost two months' delay negotiating innumerable compromises to get the three presidents to meet together (such as the terms by which Bosnian Serb President Krajišnik would swear loyalty to a Bosnian state and where to meet), the QSP became a matter of daily pressure on the parties to execute and legislate.

Measures to reassure the population and reduce uncertainty about their future also included economic reconstruction, an International Police Task Force (IPTF) to monitor and reform local police, and human rights monitoring. Critical in the minds of the outsiders assisting the peace process in Bosnia was the belief that economic incentives can bring parties to cooperate and that economic revival is the primary confidence-building measure of the process. A massive World Bank- and EU-led program of economic reconstruction and a shift among bilateral donors from humanitarian aid to reconstruction assistance were based on the view that economic activity can wean leaders from war, replace war profits with commercial profit, shift the balance of power to businesses interested in peace, and bring individuals from all sides of the war back into contact through markets and trade. Particularly in the first year after war, economic reconstruction was seen as providing a "peace dividend" to ordinary Bosnians and jobs for demobilized soldiers so that the population would not be as easily mobilizable for renewed war if leaders so chose. The freedom of movement necessary to restoring commerce and contact, and particularly the efforts by individuals to cross former front lines and return to homes located in areas governed by another national group, were to be given overall protection by the presence of international troops, if not specific personal protection.<sup>24</sup> International organizations ranging from nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch to international organizations tasked with helping to implement provisions of the accords, such as the OSCE, OHR, and IPTF, were present to provide publicity and transparency against those who might violate individuals' rights. The fact that they did not have enforcement power, however, was to present numerous ongoing problems.<sup>25</sup> The accords mandated a Commission of Human Rights for all Bosnia, and an ombudsman for each entity, to act as a check on government officials by giving publicity to violations of individual rights and initiating a process of judicial protection.

But most important in the mind of the Dayton negotiators was to break the link between leaders they saw as inciting nationalist hostility and the

vulnerable mass of the population. They thus gave priority to the obligation on all parties to the accords to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in delivering to The Hague and trial all those leaders indicted as war criminals. When this did not happen immediately, they went further, threatening to withhold economic aid from any Bosnian community that did not cooperate with the work of the tribunal. All persons indicted for such crimes were not allowed to run for office or play any other public role and were liable to arrest and extradition by the international troops. In implementing the agreement, the international authorities also sought to isolate these leaders further and to create independent television and radio stations and employ monitors of the mass media to reduce the distortion and hostility toward other groups that still characterized the media in each of the three communities; by summer-fall 1997 they were actively taking control of TV transmitters in the Serb Republic and imposing rules on mass media in both Serb and Croat areas. Beyond using the tribunal as a transitional mechanism before local courts and judges were up and running, the program to downsize and train the civilian police forces included a vetting process to prevent indicted war criminals from becoming members of the postwar police. In addition, an American organization, the United States Institute of Peace, lobbied among Bosnian groups and leaders for a Bosnian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, patterned after the South African experience, which looked set to be adopted and embraced by public opinion in late 1998.

### A Closer Look at the Settlement

History has taught us that not a single honest man of ours can be unarmed; every single one will have a rifle to defend himself.

President Izetbegović, speaking at an election rally in Goražde, May 4, 1996, in his first public appearance after signing the Dayton accords<sup>26</sup>

Conditions in Bosnia after the first thirty-two months of peace implementation raise serious doubts about the Dayton negotiators' assumptions. Twelve months' deployment under IFOR proved insufficient to reassure the interveners that war would not resume, as did the subsequent eighteen months' deployment of SFOR. Public opinion in Bosnia shared this concern, ranging from 68 percent of Bosnian Muslims to 82 percent of Bosnian Croats in January 1997 that fighting would start again in a few years.<sup>27</sup> The

behavior of neighboring states, particularly Croatia, continued to keep alive the external threat that Bosnia would eventually be partitioned by its neighbors, while the election campaign rhetoric of the three ruling parties continued to emphasize insecurity and protection, aiming to persuade citizens that their future safety depended on separation and defense through majority control by their own nation.<sup>28</sup> The SDA slogan in 1996 said it best: "A vote for the SDA is a vote for survival of the Muslim nation."

Voters rewarded this rhetoric by voting overwhelmingly for the three nationalist parties in the September 1996 elections.<sup>29</sup> In public opinion surveys in January 1997 94 percent of Bosnian Serb respondents believed that the Serb Republic should become part of Serbia (66 percent felt so strongly), and 79 percent of Bosnian Croats felt that Herzegovina should be part of Croatia (55 percent strongly); 91 percent of Bosnian Serbs and 84 percent of Bosnian Croats thought it "better for us to be independent than to remain part of Bosnia." In contrast to 98 percent of Bosnian Muslims who supported a single state for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and who based this support "in part on a sense of self-preservation,"<sup>30</sup> 94 percent Bosnian Serbs and 62 percent Bosnian Croats opposed a single state.<sup>31</sup> Many were also voting with their feet. In the first year after Dayton more than 80,000 Bosnians left their homes to move from an area where they were in the minority to one where they were with people of their own national group. Two years after the accord fewer than 30,000 of the 380,000 persons who had returned to their prewar homes did so if their home was in an area controlled by another group.<sup>32</sup> Bosnia was therefore becoming *less* multiethnic after Dayton, not more. The most striking figures were the exodus of Bosnian Croats, whose numbers in Bosnia had dwindled by November 1997 from a prewar population of 755,895 (17 percent) to fewer than 400,000 (9 percent) and, by some official reports in Croatia, to only 220,000 (5 percent).<sup>33</sup> Efforts by international organizations to facilitate return were obstructed by local authorities and citizens' groups on all sides who prevented people of other national groups from returning home to communities where they would dilute the absolute control of one national group or might become a Trojan Horse of renewed hostilities. The primary violators of human rights were the civilian police, and politicians in the federation harshly criticized the ombudsmen's reports of human rights violations as being disloyal to their nation.

If peace in Bosnia depends on overcoming fear and the obstacles to cooperation across the divisions of war, the experience of the first twenty-four months was not encouraging. To listen to international officials in the peace operation on the ground, the greatest threat to the Dayton accords was fear,

"even if in some cases this is paranoia."<sup>34</sup> Like the Cambodian settlement, as analyzed by Michael Doyle, the Dayton accords had not altered the ambitions or goals of the three political leaderships and their political parties, reduced the insecurity felt by citizens about their future, or shifted power and responsibility to persons with different interests and goals.<sup>35</sup> The accords established a cease-fire in which the war continued by other means, and none had renounced the resort to violence to achieve those goals.<sup>36</sup>

Why should this be the case with a massive international presence in support of peace? Two explanations gained early prominence. One was that the Dayton accords represented a *process* that needed time—at least five years before one should assess success or failure. The other was that peace was a matter of *political will* and that as long as indicted war criminals, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (the Bosnian Serb political and military wartime leaders), were allowed to run free, and IFOR commanders refused to arrest them, peace would not be possible. Although neither explanation is currently disprovable, a closer look at the peace agreement suggests a third explanation.<sup>37</sup> The ambiguities, uncertainties, and contradictions in the peace agreement and the overriding uncertainty about the future it induced, far from helping to remove obstacles to peace and cooperation, created the conditions for a serious security dilemma *after* the war. Even if most of the leaders who had no intention of cooperating and still wanted to defect from Bosnia or from Dayton were removed from the scene, the agreement encouraged mobilization along national lines and defensive perceptions and behavior.

### *Continuing Uncertainty About the Political Future*

First, the Dayton accords did not reduce the uncertainty over the political future of Bosnians and Bosnia. The negotiators' attempt to stop the war with a package of minimally acceptable conditions from each of the warring parties for a cease-fire, so as not to have to impose a solution by military defeat or foreign occupation, did nothing to change the terms of the political conflict. In fact, it recreated the political alignments of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war. The Bosnian Muslim–Bosnian Croat federation (the first of the cease-fires embedded in the Dayton framework) simply reproduced the parliamentary alliance on sovereignty between the SDA and HDZ of October 8, 1991, which led the Serbs to leave the parliament and set up autonomous areas. Just as international recognition in May 1992 led the Bosnian Croats to defect to their preferred position of separate



statehood, so the September 1995 cease-fire with the Serbs, which the Dayton accords confirmed, together with the strategic shifts favoring Croats in the run up to the accords, ended any incentive for Croats to cooperate with Bosnian Muslims if it required compromise with the HDZ's definition of national rights. Similarly, the success in gaining American ground presence in support of Bosnian independence, combined with the dwindling numbers of Croats in Bosnia, reduced any incentive the Bosnian Muslims had to share power equally with Bosnian Croats. And the universal condemnation of the Serbs as responsible for the war, reinforced by the insistence that they not be allowed to negotiate on their own behalf at Dayton, that sanctions remain on the Bosnian Serbs until they prove fully cooperative with all the terms of the Dayton accords, and that the primary obstacle to implementation was Serb obstruction, left Bosnian Serb leaders even more determined to hold onto and strengthen the separate sovereignty of Republika Srpska.


At the same time, the Dayton framework leaves each of the three parties feeling insecure in their gains. The Bosnian Muslims won their independent state, but they control less than one-third of the territory, including almost none of the external borders. The Dayton constitution (Annex 4 of the accords) declares that this state continues "the legal existence under international law as a state" of the former republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it also obliged the Bosniacs to give up their power base in the offices and powers of the former republican government, to merge with Bosnian Croats in the federation entity, to accept a weak common government, and to share power with the two parties who oppose a single state. The Bosnian Serbs gained their own republic, but its existence was under daily challenge—from Bosniac leaders who denounced its legitimacy the moment Dayton was signed, and from the internationally supported right of return to prewar communities and the electoral rules allowing absentee balloting in the interim that formed part of a Bosniac political campaign (including orchestrated Muslim returns to strategically located villages and towns that began in July 1996) to "liberate" the territory of the Serb Republic.<sup>38</sup> Control over the town of Brčko, which sits on the narrow corridor linking the two halves of the Serb republic and is thus seen by Bosnian Serbs as strategically essential to their survival, was assigned by Dayton negotiators, at the successful insistence of President Izetbegović, to international arbitration. The decision in February 1996 was to place the town and surrounding area under special administration headed by an American official, begin a plan of full restoration of multiethnic local administration and returns, and delay final decision until March 1997.<sup>39</sup> And, for the first two years of the Dayton imple-

mentation, conditions for economic aid left the Serb Republic with less than 3 percent of the total—in the first year, until a new government was elected and fully operating, because international donors and the high representative insisted that there could only be one representative of the Bosnian state, with its seat and occupant in Sarajevo, and that Serb leaders would have to sign contracts with the Muslim prime minister Muratović (whom they did not recognize as legitimate) before a new postwar government was elected to be eligible for any aid, and, in the second year, until Serbs agreed to their terms for one central bank, one currency, and one system of communications and transportation. Finally, the Bosnian Croats gained recognition of their right to self-determination in the power-sharing arrangements and joint defense of the federation, but they have been denied a separate republic within Bosnia and were obliged to dismantle their wartime Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna (an order they managed to ignore despite their repeated promises to comply).

Third-party intervention during the war had combined a humanitarian intervention to protect as many civilians as possible with measures, such as economic sanctions on neighboring Serbia, an arms embargo, and a no-fly zone, to lessen the lethal capacity of the armies and to facilitate ongoing negotiations with the parties over constitutional principles and a map. Because the primary war tactic of all three parties was to control territory by determining who lived there—displacing populations and creating ethnically pure areas under their control by terror, forced expulsion, voluntary exchanges, or published lists of enemies and "war criminals"—the goal of the negotiators was to foreshorten the war by an agreed division of territory within one constitutional order. The result, however, was to place a premium on gaining and holding territory as bargaining chips and to concede to the logic of separation. Although a robust international military presence after the peace agreement should have provided the environment for tentative moves toward cooperation and reconciliation, the IFOR deployment to separate armies and monitor confrontation lines in fact provided an environment for the parties to continue the consolidation of territorial control and defensive positioning without war.

Moreover, the map drawn at Dayton did not end the central focus on territory. This was in part deliberate, because the accords identified territories to be transferred from the control of one entity to the other at the end of the war. But instead of encouraging the population to stay put, the international officials did little to stop the looting, firebombing and trashing of homes and industries, and terrorizing people to leave that accompanied the





MAP 3.3. The Dayton Map: BiH Cantons and New Municipalities (According to the Federation Law passed February 1998)

Source: <http://www-osce.austria.eu.net/picsmap/cantonmap982.gif>.

territorial transfers. Croat forces occupying the area of Mrkonjić Grad and Šipovo (the "Anvil") preceded its transfer back to Serbs by their near total destruction while United Nations soldiers, with no mandate to act in the interim between their mandate and the arrival of NATO forces, stood by. The greatest, single exodus of the entire war occurred when five Serb-populated suburbs of Sarajevo were transferred to federation control, in February 1996. Although international military and civilian officials tried in vain to persuade local Serbs with a last-minute blitz of pamphlets and speeches that they would be safe, decidedly mixed messages coming from the Bosnian government (including delay until the last moment of the parliamentary vote on amnesty that was agreed upon at Dayton) and fear-inducing propaganda from Bosnian Serb official media had greater effect.<sup>40</sup> Only the violence was reduced by IFOR when it gave support for Serb buses to transport evacuees, while radicals from both Serb and Bosniac camps looted and burned. In a pattern that became more blatant over the year, the Bosniac leadership wanted no minorities in Sarajevo, and the Serb leadership had strategic interests in a wholesale Serb flight to populate areas in the Serb republic still considered insecure and vulnerable to assault, such as the strategic town of Brčko whose status remained undecided.

The Dayton map also designed a country of corridors and buffer zones that interrupt crucial lines of communication within each national territory. The purpose was to break up the contiguity of territory and prevent secession by the Serbs and Croats, but the effect was to create vulnerable enclaves of mixed population, such as Croats in central Bosnia, Serbs in the "anvil," and Muslims in the Bihać area and Gorazde, who are neither welcome nor secure. It also drew borders difficult to defend and critical communication lines that each nation, thinking as a nation, does not control (such as the road between Trebinje and Pale for the Serb Republic and the road between Sarajevo and Una-Sana canton for Bosniacs).<sup>41</sup> The result was to strengthen the incentive of Bosnian parties to maintain troop deployments and raise police checkpoints around points of dispute or insecurity and to limit the freedom of movement so essential to contact and reducing information distortions and fears. Rather than creating a necessity to cooperate on mutual interest, the territorial vulnerabilities made each group more fearful of becoming hostage to another and thus motivated to increase the territory under their single national control.

The more the population transfers continued, with more people leaving homes than returned, and the more ethnically homogeneous the territories

became, the more security within each territory seemed to matter. Bosnian Muslim leaders, in particular, revived their fears of being trapped in the interior without access to the sea (ironically, it was Serbia that had been preoccupied with having an access to the sea during the Yugoslav period and back into the nineteenth century)—a “miserable Gaza Strip,” politicians began to say during 1998. This fear was intensified by political tensions between the two federation partners and the blatant refusal of the government of Croatia to abide by its commitment at Dayton on Bosnian access to a free port (a ninety-nine-year lease) at Ploče on the Dalmatian coast.<sup>42</sup> The unreliability of Croatia on this matter made Bosnian Muslim leaders even more sensitive about unimpeded access to an alternative route north through the Brčko area and the Sava River basin to central Europe, and it intensified their efforts to get international (and particularly American) support behind their claim for ultimate control over Brčko. This in turn led Bosnian Serbs to stay on a war footing in the area and to try actively, though unsuccessfully after SFOR agreed to use force in this one area to assist returnees, to prevent Bosnian Muslims from returning there.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, the Croatian government response to the dispute over Ploče was to revive active plans for a confederation between the Bosnian federation and Croatia, a relationship encouraged in the Washington Agreement, and permitted in the Dayton accords, that only revived fears among Bosnian Muslims that Croatia still intended to partition Bosnia in two.

Finally, the Dayton accord also allowed the parties to negotiate changes in the IEBL, in the context of the joint military commissions chaired by IFOR. The result was an ongoing exchange of hundreds of villages to make areas within political boundaries more ethnically pure. In towns within the federation that were still mixed Bosnian Croats began in the spring of 1996 to insist the populations be separated into different administrative units, creating divided communities along the model of Mostar. By mid-1997 they were having some success in central Bosnia. Far from tying up the loose ends of their wartime conflict over territory, each party was moving to consolidate territorial control to reduce the insecurity and defensive vulnerabilities created by the Dayton compromises and to consolidate power for the next phase. Each party took advantage of the cease-fire and the international military presence to harass and expel remaining minorities, to prevent the return of refugees and the internally displaced persons from another group, and to use the options for voter registration to increase the ethnic homogeneity of the locality and its government.

### *Military Balance*

The aggressive posture in defense of national sovereignty by each of the three Bosnian parties facing uncertainty over the future was reinforced, moreover, by the contradictions in the military aspects of the peace settlement. Annex 1-A of the Dayton accords prescribed a classic peacekeeping approach to the interim between cease-fire and peace—the implementation of the program for military separation, weapons cantonment, and confidence-building through the exchange of information and frequent contact between officers on all three sides. The regional stabilization measures of Annex 1-B, which aimed to downsize forces and create a military balance between Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia, could also be seen as a way for outsiders to impose an arms control regime that would prevent rearmament and a new security dilemma between the three now independent states. But the one party *within* Bosnia with an incentive to rearm and to use the peace settlement as a period to prepare militarily to resume war for more territory if the political strategy did not “liberate” Republika Srpska—the Bosniac leadership (particularly the more radical wing, including the army and General Rasim Delić)—could perceive this annex as punitive, putting them at a distinct disadvantage in a regional force ratio of 1:12 if they should have to defend themselves alone against a combined Croatian-Serbian campaign (whether aimed at forcing a two-way partition or defending against new Bosniac military campaigns). At the same time, moreover, an American view of war termination held that a military balance *within* the country, between the two entities, was essential to deterring new war and that Bosnian Serb military aggression remained the primary threat to Bosnia. Thus, in a semi-secret side deal negotiated at Dayton in order to win Izetbegović's agreement to the settlement as well as a vote from the United States Congress to deploy troops, the American negotiators added a program (called “arm and train” and later changed to “train and equip” so as to appear less threatening) of military assistance to the Bosnian Muslim–Bosnian Croat Federation.

The effect of the train and equip program, therefore, appeared to override the arms control arrangements. It reinforced the perceptions of vulnerability among Bosnian Serbs, encouraged them to cheat on arms control agreements and to maintain a military presence at weak points of their *internal* frontier,<sup>44</sup> making it more rather than less like an international border, and strengthened their view that protection lay in political and military relations with neighboring Serbia.<sup>45</sup> Croatian President Tudjman announced, upon signing the arms control agreement, that he had no intention of imple-

menting it. The train and equip program also encouraged the militants in the Bosniac leadership to entertain the prospects of an eventual military victory to liberate territory from Bosnian Serbs, despite the near certainty, as assessed by outside military experts, that they could not win. Although the program required the federation to create a joint defense structure first, quarrels between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs over every issue of integrating their armies into one, including military doctrine, led the American officials behind the program to concede to a transition, allowing command levels to unify over three years and army units to remain separate. At least on the rhetorical front, Bosnian Croats and their Croatian backers called the further arming of Bosnian Muslims a threat.

Perhaps most destabilizing of all the consequences of the train and equip program is its institutionalization of the results of the war and of a structure feeding a security dilemma by professionalizing and modernizing three armies for one state, one for each of the three national communities recognized constitutionally. This concept of security might in some cases be appropriate to interstate conflict, but it implied three states, not one, and, because all three retained unresolved grievances, there was little chance that the program would stay at equilibrium, at least in the minds of each leadership. The fact that the United States sought primary funding for the program from Islamic states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, in particular), that these states made clear their interest in channeling funds and equipment to Bosnian Muslims only, not to a program that included Bosnian Croats, and that arms began to arrive independently for the Bosniac army, such as from Egypt, all raised doubts about the future intentions of the Bosniac leadership and made it difficult for the other two sides to shift focus.<sup>46</sup>

#### *Ethnic Power Sharing, Top-Down Implementation, and Impatience*

"While the challenge of weapons is real, disarmament *per se* does not necessarily enhance security unless it is part of a broader political process that seeks to reconcile conflicting parties and enhance security," writes Mats Berdal.<sup>47</sup> As Barbara Walter writes, "Only when new political systems are established that promise to deter future aggression does the mutual trust needed for long-term cooperation emerge."<sup>48</sup> The power-sharing formulas of the Dayton constitution, while perhaps aimed at mutual trust, had the opposite result in the first years of its implementation.

One problem lay in the uncertainties mentioned above, that the Serbs and Croats saw their political rights as insecure, under constant challenge by the outsiders. Their defensive reaction, in turn, led to disillusionment about Dayton among Bosniacs and an increasingly defensive posture as well. Equally important was the contribution made by the Dayton accords to the process of creating political nations out of communal identities, a wartime goal of the nationalist leaders that still had a ways to go. The accords thus appeared to legalize the ongoing partition of the country rather than to soften social and political lines of division. This facilitated a form of elite-level interaction of a collusionist kind that had characterized the year before the war. Even during the war an entire network of cooperation among army commanders, arms traders, local authorities, and even some party leaders continued to operate, and with the cease-fire the three leaderships resumed their prewar habit of bargaining on a division-of-party-spoils over control of specific ministries and jurisdictions, the distribution of benefits going to each national territory and party, and—where division was not possible—multiplying co-presidencies. But the aim of this cooperation was to lock competitors out. The three ruling parties used the resources of the international operation—humanitarian, housing, and reconstruction aid, and assistance in demarcating territory, running elections, establishing governmental ministries, and resettling populations—to increase their advantages over opposition parties, to control state media, and to prevent the dispersion of power that is necessary to developing safeguards for individual rights. The opportunity for different interests and groups to emerge and gain expression appeared tiny. Rules for ethnic representation and voting encouraged caucusing by nation on most issues, discouraged voting on interests that crossed national lines, and hard-wired alliances, preventing the essential business of democracy and supporting an authoritarian approach to politics in which radicals had a natural advantage.

The system's similarity to the institutional structure and operation of 1980s Yugoslavia gave no assurance that the tensions and quarrels of the first postsettlement period would abate. They instead appeared to be becoming institutionalized in a political system vulnerable to constant stalemate, insufficient revenues, an inability to manage macroeconomic policy and trade, and the spiraling behavior that can revive a security dilemma. The strengthening of militarized units of police forces in response to the obligations of demobilization and arms control and the creation of separate intelligence services (most active was the Bosniacs' Agency for Information and Documentation, said to gather information and train against domestic "terrorists")

did not foster trust between communities or make it easier for individuals within those communities to break down barriers to communication and gain more accurate assessments of events. Although the International Police Task Force mounted an impressive program of police reform and training, police continued to act as arms of insecure states rather than as community policing services providing law and order to protect individuals against the real threats to their security—violations of civil rights, banditry, looting, roaming criminal gangs, drunken armed soldiers running amok, crowds preventing return and burning down homes, and state terror.

Moreover, while the Dayton accords were based on the premise that individual Bosnians could cooperate as long as indicted war criminals—above all, wartime Bosnian Serb leaders—were no longer present, the accords also depended on the parties' cooperation and on working through governmental authorities who would be responsible for implementing agreements made. Thus, while many of those working for peace on the ground insisted that only a bottom-up, civil society, locally oriented, and reconciliatory approach would work to reintegrate the country, the officials followed a top-down approach. While loudly criticizing extreme nationalists as the obstacle to Dayton, the new administrators relied on leaders more or even took authority to a higher level by imposing *their* decisions on Bosnian leaders. This problem was exacerbated by the short deadlines imposed on the military deployment of American troops. If peace had to be achieved in twelve months, and then in eighteen months, it could not wait for the much slower process of rebuilding trust and social organization. This impatience to achieve the tasks of Dayton and leave quickly also led officials of the international operation (the Contact Group members and the Peace Implementation Council) to search for ever more noncoercive instruments to force leaders' compliance. Increasing use of economic aid as a political stick, punishing those who did not cooperate with the war crimes tribunal and the right of return to prewar homes by withholding economic assistance, and rewarding those who cooperated with Dayton implementation, however, did little to change leaders' behavior on issues they defined as vital.

The behavior of each party toward political demands from the Dayton officials can easily be explained by the particular nature of the political insecurities. The Bosnian Serb leaders in the first eighteen months seemed to put an exaggerated emphasis on being accorded both the reality and symbol of sovereignty within their republic, to the point of receiving no international assistance (1.3 percent). Bosnian Croats boycotted participation in the federation parliament until legislation redrawing administrative

boundaries to divide the remaining mixed (Bosniac-Bosnian Croat) towns on the Mostar model would be considered and passed, and they insisted on separation or parity wherever they shared territory or offices with Bosniacs. The Bosniac leadership ignored the requirement that they dismantle the offices of the prewar republican government, which they controlled totally by 1993, not only after Dayton obliged them to shift to the joint federation offices but even after the September elections created the mandate for a new Dayton-constituted government. They also began to insist on majoritarian rules wherever they had a numerical majority, including rejection of extensive efforts by the deputy high representative, Michael Steiner, to create a special regime for Sarajevo as a model for the capital of a multiethnic Bosnia. The demands for parity from the Bosnian Croat leadership, they argued, had been far too cocky in relation to their numerical showing in the September 1996 elections.

After eighteen months of international assistance the delays in achieving Dayton goals, the demands of frustrated Bosnian Muslim leaders, and the threat that war would resume after troops departed fed growing impatience, particularly in Washington. With a new foreign policy team in place under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a new supreme allied commander of Europe, a shift in tactics began. They would be increasingly assertive, including the use of force by SFOR, to compel cooperation on indicted war criminals, on the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in minority areas (especially in some strategic areas such as around Brčko), and on creating common institutions, reforming the police, and stopping hostile propaganda on the airwaves, particularly in the case of Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale. TV transmitters were taken over by force, broadcasts jammed from the air, Serbs and Croats both required to broadcast messages and information from the international operation, some indicted war criminals were arrested, and force was even used to assist an alternative Bosnian-Serb leader in achieving power. The caution and impartiality of the military leadership in the first year of Dayton implementation were thrown overboard.

In abandoning impartiality, however, they also disturbed the delicate balance of the Dayton accords, leading Serbs and Croats to view American action as even more pro-Bosniac than they had thought and to think even more in terms of protecting their own national interests. Predictably, this had a spiraling effect on Bosniac behavior, which also began to think increasingly about Muslim interests—even the possibility of a Muslim state and a partitioned Bosnia. Even the international authorities were trapped in the spiral. Having succeeded, at least in the short run, in finding more

cooperative leaders in the Republika Srpska, they began to see intransigence on the part of Croats and Bosniacs and moved to tighten criteria and threaten sanctions if they too did not cooperate.

The Bosnian case suggests that the dynamic and behavior associated with the security dilemma can occur within states and lead to civil war. Even clearer is the role of the security dilemma in the obstacles to reestablishing a sustainable peace that lie in fears for survival and defensive positioning on all sides. In addition to the focus on the military spirals of interstate conflict, however, the first stages of implementing the Dayton accords in Bosnia suggest that the political settlement to end civil-warlike conflicts must itself take into account the existence of a security dilemma. If the parties are ready to re-create one political space and to cooperate, but need outsiders' help in overcoming fears and defensive positioning that can lead others to respond in kind, then a military deployment for some time can make a crucial difference, as in Mozambique or El Salvador. But when the parties do not wish to cooperate in one political space, then even recognition of a security dilemma may not be enough, if the application of the concept treats the parties as strategic actors with sovereign responsibilities—if, in other words, they are treated like states in a realist's international order. The structural conditions that can create a security dilemma must be removed; they must also not be re-created. Ending a civil war requires more than a military drawdown and balance, more accurate information and transparency, and time. It requires either methods to get individuals to unseparate psychologically from exclusionary groups and feel safe independently of national communities (including the risks of political dissent within their own community), in order to entertain other possible forms of social interaction, or it requires a genuine recognition that for quite some time they will feel safe only behind those barriers and rights to self-governance and that new forms of governing such countries internally must be devised.

#### NOTES

The author is Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. The analysis and documentation for this chapter draws heavily on the author's *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995) and on *Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton Primer and Memorandum of Warning*, Brookings Discussion Papers: Foreign Policy Studies Program (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, May 1996).

1. On the many plans proposed for Bosnia, see Paul C. Szasz, "The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of Constitutional Proposals Relating to Bosnia," *Fordham International Law Journal*, vol. 19, no. 2 (December 1995), pp. 363–407.
2. Third-party negotiators can thus be treated as the statesman in Jervis's analysis of the security dilemma and the "failures of empathy": "The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it." See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978), p. 181.
3. Since August 1993 Bosnian Muslims officially call themselves Bosniacs, in part to create a state people of Bosnia that had a name more associated with the country and in part to signal to outsiders who were not familiar with the previous Yugoslav system that the three Bosnian peoples were equally constituent nations, not, as the labels sounded, two ethnic peoples and one religious grouping. In Bosnia Serbs and Croats were also largely identified with their religion (Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, respectively) and its historical, cultural, and communal aspects, while the term *Muslim* was a constitutionally recognized political identity and recognition of national rights. These terms had their origin in the role that religious membership played in defining political and economic rights and social status in the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire that ruled Bosnia from 1463 to 1878 and in the political use made of these communal distinctions when that system ended under Austrian rule (first protectorate, then annexation) between 1878 and 1918. In this essay I stay with the older term, because perceptions have been defined by that historical legacy and especially the Yugoslav constitutional order, 1945–1991. Beginning in 1993, however, it would be more appropriate to use the term *Bosniac*, as they have chosen to do. A useful and accessible introduction to that history is in Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine Jr., *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). See also Attila Hoare, "The People's Liberation Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941–45; What Did It Mean to Fight for a Multi-National State? *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 415–445.
4. The Croatian Democratic Union (the Bosnian acronym is HDZ-BiH), which was a branch of the party elected to rule neighboring Croatia under President Franjo Tudjman; the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which was only one of many parties seeking to represent Bosnian Serbs and was one branch of a party formed among Serbs in neighboring Croatia; and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which was the largest of the parties claiming to represent Bosnian Muslim interests and had also organized successfully among Muslims in neighboring Serbia.
5. Another possible outcome, discussed among the presidents of the six republics before the country's dissolution, was the partition of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. First proposed by Croatian President Tudjman in July 1990 in secret

- talks he initiated with Serbian President Milošević on the basis of territory that Tudjman claimed to be the legitimate historical borders of Croatia as confirmed by the 1939 agreement on Croatian autonomy during the first Yugoslavia, this alternative appeared to Bosnians as a constant *threat* rather than a choice.
6. Recorded in the five-part BBC (Brian Lapping Associates) documentary, "The Death of Yugoslavia," and cited in the book written to accompany the documentary, Laura Silber and Alan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, revised and updated (London: Penguin, 1997), where they quote his speech to the Bosnian parliament on February 27, 1991: "I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty" (p. 211). There were, however, other views among Bosnian Muslim politicians.
  7. Perhaps the best known example of this argument is Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), but it became the stock and trade of most political and journalistic commentary on Bosnia during the war.
  8. Political scientists tended to emphasize this thesis more. See V. P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995), 130-166; Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*; and Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), among many others.
  9. On this tendency to attribute behavior to innate dispositions, see chapter 1, this volume, by Snyder and Jervis, p. 15-37.
  10. "The fear of being exploited . . . most strongly drives the security dilemma; one of the main reasons why international life is not more nasty, brutish, and short is that states are not as vulnerable as men are in a state of nature. People are easy to kill." Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," p. 172. The competing arguments of ethnic hatred and Serbian expansionism make outsiders blind to Slovenia, which was 87.6 percent Slovene in 1991, but it was Slovene politicians who first talked about exploitation in national terms to criticize federal redistributive policies and who warned during the 1980s about the "threat" of "cultural extinction" and "linguistic contamination" from the many non-Slovenes from other parts of Yugoslavia working temporarily in the republic. See Susan L. Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 364-365, 371. The perceptual shift of "nations at risk (*ugrožen*)," recorded in political rhetoric during the 1980s, was crucial in setting the stage throughout the country psychologically for an escalating security dilemma and then war. In Sarajevo, at dinner only a month before hostilities began, a Serb woman originally from Serbia who had lived in Bosnia much of her life said to me, as if in desperation against the nationalists and their claims of victimhood and vulnerability, "I don't consider myself in peril (*ugrožen*)!"
  11. For example, Serb nationalists in Kosovo claimed that antagonism and pressure

- to leave from the Albanian majority were acts of genocide; the threat felt by Serbs at the discriminatory speech in election campaigns of Croatian presidential candidate Franjo Tudjman was associated with memories of the actual genocide against them by the fascist regime in World War II; the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action and its leader Izetbegović called the formation of a federal, reformist party by federal prime minister Marković an act of genocide; and mutual accusations of genocide were tossed frequently between the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat parties allied in the governing coalition. See also Bette Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide," *American Ethnologist*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1994), pp. 377-381.
12. Xavier Bougarel, *Bosnie: Anatomie d'un Conflit* (Paris: La Découverte, 1996), p. 11.
  13. Xavier Bougarel, "Bosnia and Herzegovina—State and Communitarianism," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 99.
  14. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.
  15. Ejub Šitković and Jasminka Udovički, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Second War," in Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway, eds., *Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare: The Inside Story of Europe's Unfolding Ordeal* (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1995), pp. 175-76. They add, "The dealers' stories could not have been as effective without the shooting and killing that started in Mostar as early as the fall of 1991 and in Bosanski Brod in early spring 1992"—from the spread of the war in Croatia into strategic Bosnian towns.
  16. "Croatian 'Pro-Fascist' Party Members in Bosnia," TANJUG, April 6, 1992, reported in FBIS, *East Europe*, April 7, 1992, p. 38.
  17. For example, the comments on an earlier draft of this paper by V. P. Gagnon, cited in chapter 1 of this volume.
  18. For an analysis of missed opportunities, see Susan L. Woodward, "Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985-1991," in Bruce W. Jentleson, ed., *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
  19. Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 217.
  20. Mary McIntosh, Martha Abele MacIver, Daniel G. Abele, and David B. Nolle, "Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Bulgaria and Romania," *Social Forces* (March 1995).
  21. Political upheaval in Serbia in November 1996-March 1997 and the diagnosis of inoperable stomach cancer for Croatian president Tudjman in mid-1996 raised the legal question, without answering it, whether these signatures were official commitments and thus legally binding on future occupants of the presidencies of Serbia and Croatia.
  22. The institutions that Weingast proposes to create the trust necessary to prevent



- preemptive war, by "[t]ying the hands of a potential aggressor" (Barbara Walter, "Domestic Anarchy and Civil War," unpublished manuscript, p. 13), have been designed to tie the hands of all three parties and guarantee against "negative tyranny."
23. The provision for confederation between Croatia and the Bosnian Federation, a central part of the Washington Agreement of March 1994 to gain the support of President Tudjman, was altered by the Dayton accords, but not so clearly that it did not become a matter for dispute and frequent interpretive intervention on the part of the Office of the High Representative (under both Carl Bildt and his successor, Carlos Westendorp), which declared in 1998 (under constant pressure from Croatia to define and formalize this relationship) that the Dayton accords overrode the federation constitution of 1994 and that all special relationships had to be bilateral, state-to-state agreements. That is, relations with Croatia and with Yugoslavia had to be approved by the Bosnian state parliament and could not be arranged between an entity and a third country. The question remained a matter of disputed interpretation and negotiations into late 1998 when an agreement was signed between Croatia and the Federation, not the Bosnian state, as a result of American negotiations.
  24. The experience of American officers and soldiers in Bosnia under IFOR in 1996, as told to this author, for example, persuaded them that Bosnians would not cross the interentity boundary line (zone of separation between the two entities) if IFOR were not there.
  25. Under urging from Human Rights Watch, the OHR began to sanction, censure, and even demand the resignation of mayors who were persistently not in compliance with the Dayton accords on issues of refugee return and human rights. During 1998 a Multinational Special Unit of international *gendarmie* was created, within the chain of command of the NATO military forces, to respond appropriately to circumstances requiring policing rather than military skills. Set to be deployed in early August 1998, its effectiveness in providing international enforcement of individual rights remains to be seen at this writing.
  26. Reported by BBC World Service, on May 5, 1996; cited by Patrick Moore in OMRI *Special Report: Pursuing Balkan Peace*, vol. 1, no. 18, May 7, 1996.
  27. Bosnian Serbs fell in between, at 72 percent (of which 44 percent were very concerned, as opposed to 33 percent of the Bosnian Croats and 24 percent of the Bosnian Muslims). In response to the question "How much confidence do you have that these accords will result in a lasting peace for us?" the combined percent saying a great deal or a fair amount of confidence was 51 percent among Bosnian Serbs, 32 percent among Bosnian Croats, and 78 percent among Bosnian Muslims. From intensive nationwide public opinion surveys and focus groups commissioned by USIA, summarized in *Public Opinion in Bosnia Hercegovina*, vol. 4: *One Year of Peace* (Washington, D.C.: European Branch, Office of Research and Media Reaction, United States Information Agency, February 1997), pp. 40–41.

28. In the USIA opinion surveys, "Since 1995, increasing majorities of Bosnian Serbs and Croats agree with the idea that 'people can feel completely safe only when they are the majority nationality in their country.'" The two groups believe increasingly that "every nation should have its own state" and that "it is better for our town to be composed of only one nationality group." Bosnian Muslims disagree with the second set of questions, but had begun to split on the first. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
29. Ironically, given the general assumptions about Bosnian parties, the smallest percentage of votes—fewer than 70 percent—was cast for the nationalist Serb (SDS) leader, Krajišnik, in contest with an explicitly antinationalist competitor, Mladen Ivanić. The highest vote tally for opposition parties went to Serb parties, and second to Bosniac parties, while there is no political competition in Bosnian Croat areas (opposition Bosnian Croat parties function in Bosniac areas; in summer 1998, however, the first cracks occurred when a splinter from the Bosnian Croat ruling party, led by its former head, did create an independent party, the New Croatian Initiative). The municipal elections one year later, in September 1997, showed the same pattern, giving electoral victories to the three ruling parties in all but a handful of municipalities, such as Tuzla, Velika Kladuša, and Banja Luka. The next round of general elections, in September 1998, repeated the pattern a third time, although there was far greater spread among Serb parties in the Serb Republic and substantial improvement in the Federation by non-national Social Democrats.
30. *Public Opinion in Bosnia Hercegovina*, p. 35.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 47, 48, 50, and 51.
32. Data are gathered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but they are inevitably estimates leading different groups to cite different numbers but the same source. Thus, a public statement by Mrs. Ogata, UN high commissioner, on November 20, 1997, said 34,000 had returned to minority areas out of 400,000 total returns of refugees and internally displaced since Dayton, whereas the U.S. Committee for Refugees cites the return of 27,000 to minority areas out of a total of 391,500 returns as of October 31, 1997, and the International Crisis Group assessment on November 18, 1997, reported 22,500 returns to minority areas out of 381,000 (171,000 refugees and 210,000 displaced persons) returning home. "Bosnian Minorities: Strangers in Their Own Land," *Refugee Reports*, vol. 18, no. 10 (October 31, 1997), pp. 6–7; "Post-war Bosnian returns mainly to one's ethnic area: UNHCR," *Agence France-Presse*, November 20, 1997, sent on "C-afp@clari.net," and ICG Report, "A Review of the Dayton Peace Agreement's Implementation" (Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, November 18, 1997), p. 4.
33. "Special Relations Necessary to Stop Exodus of Croats from Bosnia," communiqué faxed from Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations, New York, November 11, 1997.

34. By paranoia is meant fears that have no basis in reality, although they might well be provoked by political rhetoric or by other experiences that leave a traumatic trace. Discussions with, among others, the late Klaus von Heldorff in Brussels, in November 1996, after two years in the European Union Administration in Mostar and with Michael Steiner, deputy high representative for the Dayton implementation, in Sarajevo, in October 1996.
35. Michael W. Doyle, "War in Peace in Cambodia," unpublished manuscript, January 31, 1997.
36. This began to change in the summer of 1998, when some political and especially military leaders asserted publicly that the war was over.
37. During 1997 American policy toward the Dayton process changed to address both hypotheses: a commitment made by President Clinton in November 1997, followed later by a North Atlantic Council decision, to extend the mandate of the SFOR troops, including Americans, after June 1998, without deadline, until a "sustainable peace" was in evidence, and, beginning in May-June 1997, the decision to assist forcefully a shift in the center of power in Republika Srpska from hardline nationalists in Pale to politicians in Banja Luka more willing to cooperate with the international community, to use political conditionality of economic assistance more assertively to get leaders' cooperation with the Dayton accords, and, by late 1997, to use the office of the high representative to make decisions for politicians about fundamentals—such as common license plates, flag and coat of arms, common currency, citizenship laws—if they continued to delay. For the purposes of the argument presented here, this policy change only delays assessment of whether time, new leaders, or the terms of the settlement and international approaches is more likely to bring closure and end the war.
38. Bosnian prime minister during the first year after Dayton, Hasan Muratović, led the way in referring to the exodus of Serbs from areas in and around Sarajevo that had been handed to federation control by the Dayton accord (Vogošća, Ilijas, Ilidža, Hadžići, and Grbavica) as the "liberation of Sarajevo." The phrase came to be applied by Bosniac politicians, from President Izetbegović to former Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić, to the entire territory of the former republic, for example, as the theme of Izetbegović's first public appearance since Dayton, at an election rally in Goražde on May 4, 1996, and in discussing Bosniac voting and return in areas of the Republika Srpska.
39. When the decision was put off yet again into 1999, in part to give time for this multiethnic approach to local administration and more assertive international support for Bosniac and Croat returnees to make the question moot.
40. Annex 7, article 6.
41. Evidence for this sense of vulnerability grew along with discussions about the possibility that Bosnia was actually partitioned and should be recognized as such. See an early statement by the Balkan Institute in its report on the implementa-

- tion of the Dayton accords, for example: "Either a two-way or three-way partition of Bosnia would result in a militarily indefensible state. The Accords' map leaves Sarajevo exposed to artillery attack from the Bosnian Serb Republic. It also leaves Goražde, a territorial 'giraffe's neck,' completely exposed." *Prospects for Peace in a Post-IFOR Bosnia* (part 3 of 3), September 13, 1996, sent by electronic mail from "BalkanInst@aol.com."
42. Explicit negotiations to settle this matter were going on, under separate American leadership, throughout the fall of 1997 without any change in Zagreb's position.
43. An example of the tensions over Brčko can be seen in the media campaign on both sides in the months leading up to the February arbitration decision. See, for example, "The B&H Media Fortnight in Review: 6–19 January," vol. 2, no. 7 (January 22, 1997), a fortnightly report by MEDIA PLAN and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, as sent over electronic mail through "omripub@OMRI.CZ."
44. See Raymond Bonner, "Bosnian Serbs Said to Hide Big Supplies of Heavy Arms," *New York Times*, October 19, 1996, p. 6, although there was much unresolved debate among European allies (especially the British, French, Italian, and American intelligence services), until targets were met in October 1997, about which of the three sides was cheating most, since all were doing so.
45. All assessments of the Bosnian Serb army are that it is so weak, disorganized, and unable (still) to conduct offensive operations that it is no threat to the federation. Moreover, it has no territorial aspirations, only to protect what it has now. If, however, one accepts the argument, which has much validity for March 1992 in explaining the Bosnian Serb preemptive attack on Sarajevo at the start of the war, that violence is chosen when one group is growing progressively weaker or believes that the other is becoming increasingly hostile, and so decides that it is better to fight sooner rather than later, then, in spite of their lack of capacity, the consequence of the program for "military balance," Bosniac campaigns to push returns, and the Brčko arbitration could still be Serb military action.
46. Mats R. Berdal also emphasizes the destabilizing potential of this program and its approach to ending civil wars in *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper no. 303 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 30, 38, and passim. On views within Bosnia, see "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Article Says Bosniaks Preparing for War," printed in FBIS-EEU-97-267, September 24, 1997, and translated from *Slobodna Bosna*, September 21, 1997, pp. 19–21.
47. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, p. 38.
48. Walter, "Domestic Anarchy and Civil War," p. 9.