
After the Peace

Resistance and Reconciliation

edited by
Robert L. Rothstein



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8. Brendan Murtagh, *Life on a Rural Interface* (Belfast: Community Relations Council, 1997).
9. Karen Eybin, Duncan Morrow, and Derick Wilson, *A Worthwhile Venture? Equity, Diversity, and Interdependence in Northern Ireland* (Belfast: University of Ulster Press, 1997).
10. An exception to this rule is the proposals of the loyalist Ulster Defence Association New Ulster Political Research Group, which proposed an independent Ulster in their *Common Sense* document of 1979. Most nationalists regard delivery into the hands of an Ulster Protestant majority without any outside guarantees as untenable, and many Protestants are unhappy about losing the British link.
11. A blunt recent restatement of this was made by the staunchly unionist Cadogan Group of academics in a pamphlet entitled "Squaring Circles," published in 1996.
12. Even the New Ireland Forum, a constitutional nationalist think tank, in 1984 named a unitary Ireland as its "preferred" outcome.
13. The classic statement of this view of Anglo-Irish maneuverings is Arthur Aughey's *Under Siege* (London: Hurst, 1989).
14. See Paul Dixon, "Civil Society to the Rescue," *Democratization* (winter 1997).
15. Some of these ideas are explored in Duncan Morrow, "Violence and the Sacred in Northern Ireland," *Contagion 2* (spring 1995): 145-164.
16. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1942); and Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited* (London: Chatham House, 1987).
17. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990).
18. See Mike Tomlinson, "Can Britain Leave Ireland? The Political Economy of War and Peace," *Race and Class* 37, no. 1 (July-September 1995): 1-22.
19. One of the best books on this period is Paul Bew and Henry Patterson's *The British State and the Ulster Crisis* (London: Verso, 1985), although it is completely wrong on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
20. The best book on the hunger strikes is probably Pádraig O'Malley's *Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair* (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1990).
21. The republican press, such as *An Phoblacht* and the *Andersonstown News*, is full of events opposing the agreement during 1986.
22. *Irish Times*, October 28, 1993.
23. *Observer*, November 28, 1993.
24. *Irish News*, September 1, 1994.
25. *Belfast Newsletter*, September 1, 1994.
26. *Belfast Telegraph*, September 16, 1994.
27. *Observer*, September 18, 1994.
28. *Belfast Telegraph*, September 18, 1994.
29. *Sunday Tribune*, April 23, 1995. See also Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, *The Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1993-1996: A Chronology* (London: Serif, 1996), p. 97.
30. *Hansard*, January 24, 1996, pp. 353-354.

Bosnia After Dayton: Transforming a Compromise into a State

Susan L. Woodward

Third-party intervention to end civil wars succeeds, it is commonly accepted, when there is what I. William Zartman calls a "hurting stalemate." Parties are ready to shift from fighting to negotiating, with outside help because they think they can gain more by the shift. Conversely, parties do not begin to negotiate seriously, or will fail to implement a settlement, if they believe that more can still be gained by war or by holding out the prospect of a return to war. The Dayton Accords of November 21, 1995, established a "general framework for peace" to end the Bosnian war (1992–1995) through the intervention of negotiators from the United States, with backing from major European powers and their prior agreement to join forces in an international coalition and military deployment to help implement the accords. Of the three parties at war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats), however, only one could be said to have reached that hurting stalemate. That party, the Bosnian Serbs, had been ready to settle for more than two years, in hopes of consolidating politically the gains they had made militarily early on in the war. The terms of their preferred settlement, however, were not acceptable to the second party, the Bosnian Muslim-dominated² Bosnian government, or their international supporters, primarily the United States. Bosnian Croats, fully in control of their mining conditions and with unassailed backing from neighboring patron Croats, were in a position throughout the war to accept a cease-fire or hold out for more. During the summer of 1995, a change occurred in the position of one external party with influence over the warring parties—the United States. Bill Clinton's administration in Washington, D.C., facing a foreign hurting stalemate of its own with its European allies over the fate of

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and with the president's political party over the fate of elections in 1996, decided the time had come for a negotiated peace, rather than a military victory, with the Bosnian Serbs; it thus began to seek a political settlement it could accept.

Engaging in coercive diplomacy, the United States led a brief but devastating bombing campaign with its NATO allies to destroy Bosnian Serb communication lines, ammunition dumps, anti-aircraft installations, and military headquarters and to give cover to the other two Bosnian parties—temporarily aligned by Washington for this purpose since March 1994—to overrun Bosnian Serb towns in western and northern Bosnia. The goals of this military campaign were to get Bosnian Serb compliance with a *territorial division* of Bosnia—49 percent to them and 51 percent to a Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat federation—by creating such a *fait accompli* on the ground and then to deny the Bosnian Serbs' wartime goal of separate statehood by gaining their agreement to hand over negotiating authority to their patron in neighboring Serbia, President Slobodan Milosevic, in U.S.-led talks aimed at a peace agreement.³

The effect of the combined land and air campaign, however, was to reduce the incentives of the other two parties to abandon the battlefield for talk. The alliance (called a federation), which U.S. negotiators had forged between them in March 1994, had been aimed at defeating Bosnian Serbs. Now the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim armies were in a contest themselves over relative territorial control, as was clear from the fact that their ground operations to take territory from Bosnian Serbs in August–September 1995 ran in parallel but were in no place joint operations. Bosnian Croats, moreover, were fighting as units of an invading Croatian army, on a juggernaut to expel Serbs on both sides of the Croatian/Bosnian border beginning the previous May.⁴ And to prevent another Serb exodus of hundreds of thousands from the main Bosnian Serb city, Banja Luka, and a fight between the two allies—Muslims and Croats—over control of that city, NATO threatened air strikes against them as well to stop their advance.

The Political Compromise

Until the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved in the summer of 1991, the three warring parties in Bosnia had been coalition partners elected in November 1990 (the first multiparty elections in forty-three years) to govern the republic. Each claimed to speak for the national interests of their voters, in accordance with the equal constitutional rights to self-determination in Yugoslavia of the three nations of Bosnia (Muslims, Serbs, Croats), but they were not able to agree on the political future of a

post-Yugoslav Bosnia. Each sought a different state: Serbs to remain in a smaller Yugoslavia with other Serbs, Croats to leave Yugoslavia and join neighboring Croatia, and Muslims (and many non-Muslim supporters) to create an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite European-sponsored negotiations over such an agreement, impending international recognition of Bosnian independence interrupted these talks, and the conflict over their competing visions of the right to national sovereignty became a war for land. Skirmishes throughout the fall of 1991 escalated by April 1992 into full-fledged war, in which territorial control became a precondition for political control and bargaining leverage. At the same time, ruling parties in the two neighboring federal republics of Croatia and Serbia (the former now a recognized state) had their own nationalist visions for independent statehood after Yugoslavia. These visions included new international borders that together incorporated most or all of Bosnia and found expression in military support for Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, respectively.

The international community had been unwilling to do what was necessary to prevent a Bosnian war: to use coercive diplomacy in the service of a series of proposed peace plans during the fighting that would have stopped the war in midcourse when the level of ethnic parceling, destruction, and population displacement was more easily reversible and, least of all, to enter the war directly to defeat one or more of the parties. But it had also been unwilling to allow Serb military victories in 1992–1993 to dictate a peace or Muslim victories over Croats in 1993 to run their course. Humanitarian assistance to the civilian population, limits on the instruments of war (with an arms embargo, a no-fly zone, and economic sanctions), and diplomatic interference in the course of the war were aimed solely at containment—reducing the flow of refugees to Western Europe and a possible spread of war to the southern Balkans. Nevertheless, the peace negotiators declared in the fall of 1995 that Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain one sovereign country, within the internationally recognized borders of those it had as a federal unit of former Yugoslavia. Acceptable interlocutors were also identified: the leaders of Croatia (Franjo Tudjman) and Serbia (Milosevic) were to negotiate for their clients in Bosnia, apparently to commit Croatia and Serbia to Bosnian sovereignty, while the Bosnian Muslim leader (Alija Izetbegovic) was to represent Bosnia. On the basis of the coerced truce of September 1995 and its two-way territorial division, the United States and its allies began to construct a political compromise to be negotiated.

Within those borders, Bosnian Serbs (about 33 percent of the population before the war) would be allowed a republic (Republika Srpska) as one of two constitutional entities of a Bosnian state but not their war aims to secede and join the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (composed of

two remaining republics, Serbia and Montenegro). Bosnian Croats (about 17 percent before the war) received recognition of their right to self-determination in constitutional documents and power-sharing agreements within the other entity, a federation with Bosnian Muslims, but they were also denied the choice of separation, to join Croatia, as they wished, and, unlike the Serbs, were not permitted a separate republic (their *de facto* Herzeg-Bosnia) within the new Bosnian state. Bosnian Muslims (about 44 percent before the war) won the sovereign Bosnia that they sought, but they had to share power in the federation entity with Croats, dismantle the central republican government, over which they had achieved total control during the war, and accept Muslim majority control in only 27 percent of the territory.

This compromise was institutionalized with a constitutional balancing act, combining a single country with substantial decentralization. By requiring the Bosnian Muslims to abandon the central government of the former Bosnian state in favor of substantial devolution of power and jurisdictions to the two entities, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were to gain protection against the dominance they said they feared from the more numerous Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Serbs and Croats, in turn, had to stay in Bosnia. The Bosnian state designed by the constitution in the Dayton Accords resembles more the European Union (EU) than most modern states. It has a common market and a central bank operated by a director from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a currency board for six years; a parliament of delegates representing the three nations (in two entities); a shared, large-scale infrastructure; and a bureaucracy to staff these foreign and macroeconomic functions, financed by means of equal contributions from the three communities. The primary jurisdiction of its umbrella government (Serbs preferred calling it a "thin roof") was foreign policy, including foreign economic relations—but not defense. All the normal functions of government, from the collection of taxes and customs duties to defense, and from education to property rights and the judiciary in between, were devolved to the two entities.

The political system was designed on the principle of power sharing among the three national communities, which meant that representation and decisionmaking in the all-Bosnian institutions and in the two entity institutions were based on national identity and ethnic subdivisions. Thus, the president is a committee of three members, one Muslim, one Serb, and one Croat. The upper house of the parliament has fifteen delegates, each community sending five. While representation to the lower house does not specify national qualifications for election, its forty-two members are elected proportionally "within their respective entity"—thus, in practice, one-third from each of the three nations. Citizens can freely register to vote in any part of Bosnia, based either on their 1991 residence or their

choice of postwar residence, but they can be elected to office only in the territory of "their" nation. An individual in the "wrong place"—a Croat in Muslim territory, a Serb in Croat territory, a Muslim in Serb territory, a Jew, Romi, Turk, Vlach, Bulgarian, or other minority or person of mixed background anywhere, and so on—is discriminated against on the basis of ethnicity, no matter how free and fair the election. Although reflecting the prewar Yugoslav system that guaranteed the right of self-determination to each recognized ("constituent") nation through the proportional distribution of offices and decisionmaking rights, this constitution in fact divided Bosnia in a non-Yugoslav way: Serbs no longer had a right as constituent nation in the federation (although they had comprised 17 percent of its prewar population, equal to the proportion of the Croatian population in all of prewar Bosnia), and the Republika Srpska was a Serb entity in which non-Serbs who asserted their right to return home (established by the Dayton Accords) would also be treated as minorities, rather than as constituent nations.

The comparison of the Dayton constitution to the European Union provides an important warning for Bosnia's future. This highly decentralized country—more like a confederation of three national communities—is likely to suffer the same "democracy deficit" as Brussels and Strasbourg and similar obstacles to political integration from jealously guarded national sovereignties. No powers or functions were granted to the common government that might inspire loyalty or identity among all Bosnian citizens—with the possible exception of the Commission on Human Rights—or that would tie politicians elected to the central government to domestic issues and constituents. The accords built in few rewards for power, status, or wealth in joint activities at the center or in common institutions that might nurture centripetal over centrifugal forces. They provided no means to instill a sense of protection for people who wished to choose nonethnic or mixed-ethnic identities (against pressures from their own group to conform), except the ombudspersons for human rights, which were also subordinated to ethnically defined authority in the entities.

There is even some doubt whether the power-sharing arrangements institutionalized by the Dayton constitution would be able to function at all or would necessarily be subject to constant stalemate. As a result of the national guarantees in the constitution, the parliament could only take decisions by qualified majority. If leaders of any one of the three constituent nations chose to define an issue as in its vital interests, they could block proceedings by abstention and turn to their provincial (entity) assembly for a vote. In cases of such "vital interests," votes in parliament would be tallied according to entity (and by each nation in the federal entity), and legislation would require a majority of each nation—and two-thirds within each entity if a decision of the presidency was at issue. Even if few issues

are classed as vital, this provision encourages parliamentary delegates to caucus by nation on most issues, discourages voting on interests that do not align by nation, and places nonnationalist parties in permanent opposition.

Implementation

Although the three parties at war had different incentives to comply with the peace agreement, and none behaved as if they had reached a "hurting stalemate," there is a separate literature regarding the success or failure of settlements to civil wars after they have been negotiated and signed and are ready for implementation. In this case, the determining factor is the willingness of outsiders to assist in their implementation.⁵ The question in November 1995 when the Dayton Accords were signed was, thus, whether external powers would be willing to do what was necessary to make this compromise work.

The results of the first two years of Dayton's internationally supervised implementation did little to change the situation at the time of its signing—the political system being shaped reflected the mixed compromises of the Dayton constitution, and the parties continued to withhold commitment with provisions they considered to be against their national goals and interests. Primary attention in the first eight months was focused on consolidating the cease-fire by implementing Annex 1A (the military aspects of the accords), and the process went very well. But in supervising the military separation of forces and cantonment of weapons and soldiers, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), by the very nature of its task, reinforced the lines of separation drawn by battle. Civilian tasks took a backseat to consolidation of the truce, and because those in charge of civilian tasks had no authority other than the commitment of the parties to peace implied by their signatures on the accords (the Bosnian Muslims and the proxies in Croatia and Serbia of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs) and because military authorities insisted on a strict separation between military and civilian aspects of implementation, the diplomats overseeing civilian tasks depended on the cooperation of the three nationalist leaderships, issuing exhortations of their moral responsibility to implement what they had agreed. To legitimate the authority of Bosnians over the peace process, and thus to hasten implementation of the political settlement, in fact, elections for new Bosnian governments (common, entity, and, in the federation, cantonal) were rushed—held ten months to the day after the accords were formally signed at Paris. But this pace gave insufficient time for opponents to the three warring nationalist leaderships to organize party members, mobilize funds and independent media, or reach voters. Moreover, in making appointments to the official commissions, such as on elections, displaced persons and refugees, human rights, na-

tional monuments, transportation, and public corporations, which the peace agreement designated for the transition from war to peace, international administrators reached automatically for "one Bosniac, one Croat, and one Serb," thus giving the three *official* parties control by default over personnel choices and the policies that would result.

The Bosnian parties themselves interpreted all aspects of the implementation process and their responsibilities, including the election process and the issue of refugee returns, as opportunities to consolidate or increase their control over territory—as if the accords were only a new stage in the war over political control. Negotiations over foreign aid and technical assistance dragged on and on while the parties fought over who had authority to sign for the country. The formation of governments and ministries after the elections was further delayed by fights over who would gain which governmental portfolios and jurisdiction and the patronage and funds that they bring. The three ruling parties thus took up their prewar practice where they had left off, during the one year and three months when they governed in coalition—namely, to collaborate on a division-of-spoils principle, competing over party control of specific ministries and jurisdictions and over the distribution of benefits going to each national territory and party while locking competitors out.

The negotiators' idea, in other words, that a single but decentralized country was a compromise through which each party would gain something did not appear to settle the conflict. Bosnian Muslims refused to dismantle the republican government they controlled, until pressured in early 1997 to acknowledge the results of elections and the accords, and then they showed no interest in signaling to others that they did not wish to dominate. A primary example illustrating this fact is that they insisted on majoritarian rules wherever they had a numerical majority, including rejection after many months of extensive efforts by the deputy high representative, German diplomat Michael Steiner, to create a special regime for Sarajevo as a model for the capital of a multiethnic Bosnia, and obstruction into 1998 of the return home of non-Muslims. The idea that the Dayton Accords were restoring a multiethnic Bosnia, and that this was the wartime goal of the Muslim leadership, got no support from that leadership itself. Taking advantage of the right of people to return to their prewar homes, it also orchestrated a campaign of returns by Muslim refugees and displaced persons to places in the Republika Srpska that were strategically located villages and towns, as if the right to return (and later municipal elections) was simply another means to continue the war for territory and it had no intention of accepting the legitimacy or finality of a separate Serb entity. The Muslim leaders took every advantage of the insistence by international donors that there can be only one representative of the Bosnian state, with its seat and occupant in Sarajevo.

The Bosnian Serb leaders, for their part, acted to protect all measure of sovereignty within their republic, to the point of such minimal cooperation with the aspects of the Dayton Accords that mattered to the international actors that they received no international assistance (1.3 percent of the total disbursed) in the first two years of peace. For example, they refused to accept the requirement from international financial institutions that they sign contracts with the wartime Muslim prime minister Hasan Muratovic; they delayed for almost two months participating in the common governmental institutions elected in September 1996 and obstructed the formation of the central bank and common currency into late 1997; and they did almost nothing to allow non-Serbs to return to their prewar homes, as the Dayton Accords guaranteed, or to cooperate with the International Tribunal for War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia by handing over indicted war criminals to The Hague.⁶

Bosnian Croats, finally, made no moves, as required by the peace accords, to abandon their separate military and governmental apparatus (which they called the "Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia," but which was not recognized by the Dayton Accords) and merge into a single federation with Bosnian Muslims. They also insisted on either parity or separation wherever they shared territory or offices with Muslims. Throughout 1996 and 1997, they refused to participate in the federation parliament until legislation was placed on the agenda (and adopted) to redraw administrative boundaries of the remaining mixed (Bosnian Muslim-Bosnian Croat) towns to divide them into separate administrative units along the model of the divided city of Mostar, which they had stubbornly resisted reuniting against constant international pressure since March 1994. In autumn 1997, they added a campaign, endorsed by the federation's minister of education, to create separate elementary schools in the federation for Croat and Muslim children, offering each group of young people the right to study in their own language (even though the language was the same) so that separate textbooks could inculcate a different curriculum and separate sense of political community.⁷

The first stage of the Dayton peace, therefore, revealed that it had stopped the war before any of the three warring parties had achieved its political goals and that this mattered to the extent of its implementation. The primacy of national identity and nationalist goals over reintegrative identities and political forces was given official recognition, and the map drawn at Dayton, which required a few transfers of territory between the two entities and allowed other transfers if mutually agreed, completed the aim of the war: to change the geographical distribution of the population so that separate national control over territory was irreversible. The one remaining significant exception to this manufactured homogeneity at the time of the truce—five Serb suburbs of Sarajevo—was lost, despite contrary

international intentions and protest, in the massive exodus and expulsion of Serbs in February 1996 (with both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs playing their part). At the same time, the accords did not affirm the irreducible element for peace of each of the three—*external* recognition of their *national right* to self-governance—nor did it choose among their conflicting political views of a Bosnian state. The Dayton peace agreement is not a political settlement. The ruling parties used their truce to continue the war by peaceful means.

The Peace Strategy Behind the Accords

Beneath the explicit tasks assigned the warring parties by the Dayton Accords and international officials were four implicit strategies to get around willful obstacles by the parties and create a peace process to transform this truce into a sustainable peace and its political compromise into a state.

The first, and most important to the U.S. negotiators, was a strategy of military balance. In the view of the Clinton administration, the war had been the result of a military imbalance to the advantage of the Bosnian Serbs, which allowed them to overrun 70 percent of Bosnian territory and to murder or expel all non-Serbs (primarily Muslims) from it within nine months of the start of the war. This aggression was made possible by the assistance of the Yugoslav federal army (itself in dissolution into an army dominated by Serbs for a new rump Yugoslavia), which had left them weapons, officers, and supplies in their forced retreat from Bosnia and gave logistical support and material thereafter. The only way to end the war and prevent its resumption, in the U.S. view, was to create a military balance between the Serbs and the allied Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, equipping and training the latter to deter further Serb aggression and to make them decisive on the battlefield should they need to defend themselves again. This “train-and-equip” program for a federation-entity army was not, in fact, a part of the peace accords, but among side agreements between the U.S. negotiators and the Bosnian Muslims made known to U.S. allies only later in the process of obtaining President Izetbegovic’s signature on the accords and congressional support for sending U.S. troops. The program also contained the prior condition that there be a federation army; namely, that the two armies—the Croatian Defense Councils, which were actually units of the Croatian army, and the Bosnian government army (*Armija*)—unite into one under joint command. Within the peace accords, however, there was also a provision for arms control (Annex 1B) according to the venerable tradition of peace agreements and recent European experience in ending the Cold War on the European continent: that arms reductions and limitations are the means to prevent

renewed war. An arms control agreement negotiated at Vienna within six months of the accords incorporated all three countries—Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia—and a process of arms reductions by October 31, 1997, of Serb holdings. The task of overseeing the military stabilization annex and its obligatory reductions was handed to the NATO-led IFOR.

The second implicit strategy was justice. There had to be a way to stop the cycles of revenge and unavenged historical grievances, which many outsiders viewed as the cause of the war, from renewing the violence after international troops departed. For the U.S. negotiators, this had two aspects: giving each Bosnian family a right to return to their prewar home if they wished (and to receive compensation for their property if they chose not to return), and taking international responsibility for the indictment, prosecution, and punishment of persons responsible for war crimes so that the average Bosnian felt that "justice" had been done and would be spared from taking it into his or her own hands. Many also argued that if people were able—through the right to return, an internationally supervised environment of security, and freedom of movement throughout the former country—to reconnect with former neighbors, friends, schoolmates, or work colleagues, then the process of forgiveness and reconciliation viewed necessary to peace could begin.

The third strategy was economic reconstruction. Under the initial leadership of the World Bank, a massive program of economic reconstruction and assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina was drawn up for donors on the widespread recognition that if the economy did not begin to revive and the majority of the population remained without jobs for some time, and especially if demobilized soldiers found no work, then there would be renewed popular support for politicians and generals willing to wage a new war. A concept of reconstruction and myriad projects were designed even before the Dayton negotiations began,⁸ and donors' conferences were held several times during the first year alone to obtain pledges, eventually of \$5.5 billion over three to four years. While the World Bank mission continued to take the lead in implementing this program, it joined forces early on with the European Commission and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the EBRD was established to assist former socialist countries in Eastern Europe in making the transition of macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, and privatization to market economies). Governmental aid agencies followed their troops on the ground, providing bilateral humanitarian and developmental assistance to localities; the United Nations Development Programme took up residence; the Netherlands financed Bosnia's debt arrears to the IMF so it could gain membership immediately; and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations expanded from relief to conflict resolution, human rights, democratization, and development work. Although the World Bank staff was preoccupied

the first year with large-scale infrastructural projects, it began the second year by insisting on economic reform and policies for cost recovery. The peace would not be self-sustaining, it argued, if Bosnia was unable to make the transition to a market economy from its socialist past and if it did not develop policies and governmental capacity to become economically viable but remained instead a ward of the international community and plagued with debt.

The fourth strategy was political institutionalization. While the Dayton constitution laid out the principles of a sovereign Bosnian state, the implementation process had to create the offices, ministries, and fundamental legislation of an entirely new political system. And because much of the peace process depended on a functioning government, the international administrators in the Office of the High Representative—the civilian coordinating field staff for the Dayton process—drew up a list of the essential offices and legislation that would need to be adopted as soon as the first elections were over (the list was even called the “Quick Start Package”) and then took the lead in pushing their adoption rapidly. As with the early elections and a program of police reform, the goal was to leave the Bosnians to their own devices as soon as possible, equipped with Western institutions.

In fact, all four strategies aimed at a quick retreat of the international community. The Dayton Accords were the result of impatience among the major powers—with four years of war and refugees, a humanitarian operation (the United Nations Protection Force), and a succession of peace negotiations—that had led them in 1995 to force a negotiated end to the war. The driving force of the peace process was also impatience. To gain congressional approval for U.S. troop participation in an international implementation force considered essential to a successful peace, President Clinton offered to deploy troops for only twelve months. This temporal limitation set the pace for peace. Deadlines were incorporated into the accords, and success was measured by the timeliness of task completion.

Nonetheless, it soon became apparent that a twelve-month limit was foolish, that the international community also did not have a ready-made capacity for implementing its responsibilities, and that the parties had no intention of cooperating quickly with provisions that they viewed as undermining their wartime goals. As soon as President Clinton was reelected, in November 1996, he announced a new troop deployment of eighteen months. By its midway point, moreover, sharp debate ensued within Washington and between Washington and its main European troop-contributing allies over whether yet another deployment would be necessary (after June 1998) to sustain the gains of the cease-fire and prevent war from resuming because those gains were not yet self-sustaining.

While the unexpected delays in the departure of international troops was due in part to the fact that the parties were using the implementation

process to continue the war, causing frequent delays due to explicit obstructions or constant haggling over the terms of the accords and of power sharing, there were also delays as a result of contradictions among the four implicit strategies of the peace agreement itself. The war termination element was internally contradictory. The train-and-equip program for the federation army discouraged Bosnian Serbs from implementing the arms control agreements rapidly or from reducing by half the size of its police force, as the civilian policing reform by the UN's International Police Task Force demanded. With their army disintegrating, their equipment in an extreme state of wear and disrepair, and discouraging signals from the Yugoslav army about future support, the Bosnian Serbs saw the train-and-equip program as building an offensive capacity for a new Muslim-initiated war and thus a vital threat against which they had to build a defense, such as in the police, where the accords allowed.⁹ The United States had billed the train-and-equip program as the best method to end the war definitively and as the means to an early exit of troops because a local self-defense capacity would be in place, but by mid-1997, the program was instead becoming the primary reason to prolong the international troop deployment, including U.S. units. European allies and U.S. military critics of the program began to insist that the influx of new arms and training to the one party that felt itself most aggrieved territorially (Bosnian Muslims) had become a new source of war, against which the only deterrent was a continued international military presence.

The goal of the Dayton compromise, to assure all three communities their claimed right to self-determination within a single Bosnia, was also in conflict with the two elements of the strategy for justice because the indictment of war criminals and the return of refugees to prewar homes were perceived by the two minority groups—Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats—as weapons in a new war to reverse their territorial gains and thus their right to self-determination. The Hague tribunal indicted only a handful of low-level Bosnian Muslims for war crimes, while it indicted more than fifty Bosnian Serbs, including their top political and military leaders, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and more than a dozen Bosnian Croats, some quite prominent in the war. Bosnian Serbs, in particular, thus viewed the tribunal as a political instrument against them, profoundly biased, and they refused to cooperate in handing over indictees. Bosnian Croats also delayed cooperating for two years and then began to question as well why it was that no Bosnian Muslims had been indicted for crimes against Croats. In addition, for all three leaderships, the obligation to implement the Dayton commitment to the right of return was perceived as *reducing* their security, since territorial control was seen as necessary to national rights, and that control was insecure if the local ethnic balance did not favor their side. Resistance to allowing persons whom they had expelled to

return was strongest among Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, but Bosnian Muslims also began to create homogeneous communities (beginning with the capital city, Sarajevo, in February 1996) and to make minorities feel unwelcome in their areas, despite their continuing insistence on the right of Muslim returns as the *sine qua non* of the Dayton Accords.

In addition to these contradictions in the design of the peace accords, the process of implementing it also encountered conflicts among tasks and goals that tended to produce vicious circles, whereby achieving one goal would reduce the chance of achieving another and efforts to intensify implementation of some aspects would cause a slowdown in others. For example, because the Bosnian Muslim leadership viewed the right of Muslims to return home as critical to compensating for its political control in only 27 percent of Bosnia and for its loss of a central government it controlled, it also began to feel more insecure when Muslims were not being allowed to return, and thus to seek other sources of control and to demand international action. These actions, in turn, made the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs resist all the more. Within months of the start of implementation, refugee organizations and aid workers abandoned programs for minority returns and directed their resources to returning home people who would be going where their ethnic group was in the majority. At the same time, diplomats in the Contact Group and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—the two international committees overseeing the peace process—began to seek more robust but noncoercive means of securing compliance on indicted war criminals and the provisions for return. Resorting to political conditionality of all economic assistance as the primary instrument of leverage over the parties' compliance, they threatened to withhold assistance to any community (local or national) that was not cooperating with the tribunal on the right of return. But because the housing shortage, and thus the gridlock of displaced persons in other peoples' homes, was a genuine reason for some communities to resist returning refugees (where would they put their own displaced when previous residents moved back?), the lack of economic assistance, including funds for new housing, became an additional reason—or excuse—for obstructing returns.

Political conditionality for economic assistance, as an instrument for gaining compliance, also conflicted with the economic-reconstruction strategy of peace building. The more Bosnian Serbs were perceived to be obstructing the accords, the more economic punishment was used against them. The economic reconstruction perceived to be a critical element of peace building, to provide jobs and give a peace dividend in improved lives that would win adherents to peace among the population, did not occur in the Bosnian Serb entity until 1998. Two years after Dayton, the federation had received 98.3 percent of all assistance, and the Republika Srpska, 1.7 percent. While unemployment in the federation had been

reduced in the second year of peace from 90 to 50 percent, it remained at 90 percent in the Republika Srpska, which did little to improve Serbs' commitment to Bosnia and the accords.

This operational economic element of the peace strategy was also in conflict with the fourth strategy, political institutionalization. Because aid was no longer humanitarian and would have to be repaid, it could not be given until there were legitimate authorities to be accountable for the implementation of projects and repayment of loans. Both within the federation and between the two entities, economic reconstruction depended on contracts and agreements that the parties were not yet ready to make with one another; the disbursal of monies depended on the formation of governmental institutions, such as a central bank, customs authorities, and tax systems, which were taking substantial time to create and reform. And because these political disagreements and the lack of progress on reintegration began to suggest that the Dayton Accords were not a compromise but a stalemate, international actors grew increasingly impatient.

International Impatience

Because the international commitment to the Bosnian peace process was governed by the willingness of NATO powers, and thus the United States, to deploy troops, the debate over that deployment in major foreign capitals, above all Washington, began to take on a life of its own. During 1997, and during the second military deployment (of what is called the Stabilization Force [SFOR]), outsiders debated whether the accords had ensured Bosnia's survival as a single, multiethnic state or had, in fact, recognized its partition. This debate between the partitionists and the Daytonists was expressed as an argument about time: Should the military deployment end in June 1998 by accepting a fait accompli of partition so that troops could leave, or did the Dayton Accords need patience to be fully implemented? Pressured by the announcement in February 1997 by the new U.S. secretary of defense, William S. Cohen, that U.S. troops would withdraw definitively at the end of the second deployment, in June 1998, a new U.S. foreign policy team under a new U.S. secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, attempted to pick up the pace of implementation during the spring. The goal was to demonstrate progress by June 1998 in implementing key provisions of the accords to an opposing U.S. Congress—in case it decided that yet another troop deployment was necessary.

To hasten the pace, U.S. diplomats became far more assertive in imposing certain provisions of the accords. This soon became manifest in U.S. pressure, for the first time, on Croatia to cooperate and to get Bosnian Croats to cooperate in handing over indicted war criminals and allowing

refugee returns. Expressions of frustration with Bosnian Serbs also grew louder and motivated action. The lack of visible progress toward a reintegrated Bosnia was explained by the recalcitrance of Bosnian Serb leaders toward some provisions of the accords and, in particular, by the continuing presence of the aforementioned indicted war criminal and wartime political leader Radovan Karadzic, who was accused of remaining politically active, despite his formal removal from official positions as required by Dayton, and of presenting the primary obstacle to the accords. The PIC met at Sintra, Portugal, in May and vowed to use all measures possible, including intensified political conditionality of aid, to get results, thus winning the battle within the international operation against those who argued that economic recovery was essential to the process of peace and should not be an instrument of other goals. During the summer of 1997, new leadership in NATO (in the form of a new supreme allied commander for Europe, General Wesley Clark) and in the British foreign office (when British parliamentary elections brought the Labour Party to power and a new foreign minister, Robin Cook) reversed the reluctance until then of NATO commanders and the Pentagon to use force for any other aspects of the accords than their strictly military obligations under Annex 1A and Annex 1B. Their concern had been that to do so would be to abandon the impartiality that they viewed as necessary to performing their military obligations under the Dayton Accords and to the low risk of casualties needed to continue support at home for their deployment. Now NATO troops arrested some indicted war criminals and began actively to support, with the use of force, a U.S. policy to transform Brčko, the strategically vital town linking the two halves of the Serb entity, into a multiethnic core of a future Bosnia, including military support for the efforts of Muslim refugees to return to their homes there. By July, they were using force to intervene in a quarrel within the Bosnian Serb leadership in support of an alternative power center around the elected president of the Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic, and her efforts to purge and reform the police (including forceful change of personnel in police stations), to wrest monopoly control over the media from leaders in Pale by creating an alternative official media (which SFOR troops aided by taking physical control of TV transmitters), and to shift political power and revenues away from the leadership in Pale to her and the northern city of Banja Luka.

By October 1997, the tide was beginning to turn in the Washington debate over troop deployment in favor of the Daytonists, who opposed premature withdrawal from Bosnia and who feared failure through a resumption of war. In contrast to the wait in 1996 for a decision on whether there would be a follow-on force the second year, both the Clinton administration and NATO leaders began to make it clear that there would be a continued military deployment after June 1998. The announcement came in

late November, and the deadlines for implementing the accords were replaced with "benchmarks" toward a "self-sustaining peace" that had no specific time limits attached.

The Partition Debate

At the same time that the Daytonists won on the issue of time, however, the partitionists were beginning to win the wider debate regarding perceptions about the conflict itself and the substance of a peace process. Basing their policy recommendations on a primordialist view of the causes of war in Bosnia, the partitionists went beyond a realist position about spending resources in line with interests, which they believed to be low in the case of Bosnia, to a philosophical position that war based on ethnic conflict and historical hatreds would never yield to a stable solution through a multiethnic political system.¹⁰ This hatred, they argued, had been magnified by the atrocities of the war such that reconciliation was not possible. There were only two choices: partition or renewed war. By this logic, the Dayton Accords were increasingly seen as idealistic and in need of adjustment because they aimed to transform a war-torn, demolished society and a territory divided by three nationalist parties, separate areas of control, and ethnically homogenized villages and towns into a multiethnic, integrated, sovereign state.

Moreover, according to this unfolding school of thought, Bosnia was now an example of post-Cold War conflict in general: ideological wars of the Cold War period had, it argued, given way to ethnic conflicts, which had different characteristics and were best addressed by population transfers and territorial partition if the goal was to minimize loss of life. The Dayton implementation process was becoming a test of mechanisms for regulating international order, not of a hypothesis about "ripeness" for negotiating an end to war or of explanations of the success or failure in implementing those negotiated settlements.

The difficulty with the primordialist and partitionist views of Bosnians and their war is empirical: they are contradicted by a large body of evidence. Key to all of that evidence is the abstraction and selection, by these outside partitionists, of one particular political identity they believe characterizes the Bosnian conflict and Bosnians over many alternative identities or combinations of identity. Bosnians, for example, whatever their ethnic or national identity, share a common political culture, as *Bosnians*, that distinguishes them from other persons of the same national community in neighboring parts of the former Yugoslavia. The claim of each of the three communities for total political power, privilege, and protection so as to avoid becoming a cultural or political minority in a state governed by

majoritarian rules need not lead necessarily to separate states. Moreover, the origins of the conflict in former Yugoslavia occurred in a society where ethnic (national) identity was not the single most important core of people's private or public identity, not to speak of the 40 percent of the population living in mixed marriages, the large number who themselves were the product of mixed unions, many generations over, and their children. Choices forced by war into one of the three communities were not really choices. These choices simply ignore the many people in Bosnia who did not belong to any of the three national communities but to one of many other minority ethnic groups. Nor are the three national communities internally homogeneous. Differentiation within each community is as great as or greater than the differences among the three—differences born of the many characteristics that matter more to individuals and households than their national identity, such as political views, religious practice, local loyalties, regional identities, class interests and professional identities, and even peace tactics. And even if these facts were not true, why would one assume that transforming substate nationalities into state nationalities necessarily creates stability, rather than instead opening up further causes of instability? The partitionists have no answer to this. In the Bosnian case, ethnic homogeneity of local communities—the result of the war—is not the same as whole territories washed of others that can be separated by defensible state boundaries and become three viable, independent states.

Even if the three Bosnian communities are territorially separable in a way that might facilitate a true partition into separate states, the current post-Dayton situation does not reflect the basic requirements, beginning with the Bosnian Croat and Muslim divided municipalities that abut each other. To begin with, an entirely new set of borders would have to be drawn—by a new Dayton-style conference or by a new war—and many more hundreds of thousands of people moved. Even then, none of the three can survive without cooperating economically. A simple look at the map, communication lines, trading routes, and economic specializations will show that trade among sovereign entities will not be enough to make each viable economically. Finally, the partitionist argument presumes the creation of pure nation-states out of the former Yugoslavia—a Greater Croatia, a Greater Serbia, a Bosniac Bosnia (the borders of which might include areas of contemporary Serbia and Montenegro), and presumably a greater Albania, combining Albania, Kosovo, parts of Montenegro, and parts of western Macedonia. Partitionists do not propose how these new borders would be drawn throughout the region, when they could not be drawn in 1991, and they have not tested the other half of their partition equation: that Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats and the territory each controls in Bosnia would be welcomed by their national homelands—the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia. Much anecdotal

and public opinion survey data reveals strong opposition to annexation of their co-nationals; the majority in both neighboring states appear to prefer that their Bosnian cousins remain in Bosnia.

Dealing with the Causes of a Conflict

The partitionist argument does not, in fact, deal with the causes of conflict, arguing instead that once a conflict becomes defined ethnically, then population movements and separation are the only stable solution.¹¹ They do not address how ethnically defined communities would be better suited, after separation, to manage the original causes of the conflict than ones that are mixed (particularly as in the Bosnian case, where mixed identities were the rule). Moreover, the term "ethnic conflict" is a misnomer. The conflict in Bosnia is *national*, not ethnic; it is about states' rights and about the right to and content of citizenship. But it is also about a transitional moment, when the characteristics of the conflict are defined by the *previous* system, not by aspirations for the *future*.

The starting point of any peace process is to recognize the causes of war—in this case, the effort by Yugoslav politicians to redefine the basis of citizenship and its political rights during the 1980s, when the socialist system and its concept of citizenship were losing both political legitimacy and the budgetary resources necessary to that concept. Of the two alternative concepts of citizenship then possible within the Yugoslav system, communitarianism in Bosnia began to win out over the civic alternative during 1990, when the political system was taking a dramatic shift from one-party rule to multiparty elections.¹² Under conditions of economic crisis, political power becomes more clientelistic. When the ruling Communist Party collapsed at the end of January 1990 and the two northwestern republics became assertively secessionist, new political parties in Bosnia—legal only from early 1990—sought to imitate the ruling Communist Party through appeals that would maximize their following and their control over the levers of state power through maximum control over people's loyalties and livelihoods. Appeals to communal loyalties and collusive tactics among nationalist politicians not to disturb one another's political space were an easy route to monopoly power, within national communities, within the republic. The socialist conception of the state as providing material protection was replaced with the concept of the nation as the protector and refuge for members of a single national community, to the exclusion of others—first in terms of economic rights and privileges, then in cultural expression, and finally in purely physical terms of survival. People were persuaded by political rhetoric, distorted information, economic crisis, and actual discrimination to fear becoming a member of a

minority, despite decades of legal (and in a wide sense, substantive) equality, while politicians claimed power and authority by defining human rights in group (national) terms. These claims were made above all in terms of economic assets; namely, political power remained a means to control money, jobs and patronage, and the property that was becoming available through privatization.

Instead of a brief, transitional form of political competition on the road to democratization and a market economy, nationalism and nationally based competition in Bosnia were institutionalized by the war. The economy and society of Bosnia were transformed into three separate political communities linked primarily by criminal networks and petty traders. But this war economy and war psychology were not stable either. As a result of war, the peace-building process faced three immediate issues before a stable future could be constructed. The war and politicians' rhetoric had together created an internal security dilemma, by which Bosnians of one national community perceived members of the other communities with fear and defensiveness, making it difficult to disarm psychologically and militarily so that one overarching community could start to regenerate once the cease-fire held. Individuals were not ready for reconciliation. And the fuzziness of the political arrangements created by the compromises of the Dayton Accords prolonged and even increased uncertainty about both the internal character and the external relations of the future independent Bosnian state and citizens' rights.

Whereas partition might provide a short-term solution to the second issue, by declaring the question of reconciliation across ethnic communities irrelevant, that would not deal with reconciliation between citizens and the leaders who had led them to war and produced little else. The first issue, the security dilemma, might be transferred from the individual level to state relations, but it would still have to be resolved at the level of border relations. The third issue of the nature of a postsocialist state and political society, the one that was the immediate cause of war, would remain. If at least two out of the three immediate issues of peace building would not be solved by partition, it would seem to make more sense to address them directly.

An Internal Security Dilemma

Fear of cohabitation in one state with the numerically stronger and internationally supported Bosnian Muslims has been so well ingrained in the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat populations, as has fear for the Bosnian Muslims of becoming a minority or even ceasing to exist altogether in a Bosnia divided between its neighbors, that any process of reconciliation requires time and consistent reassurances directly aimed at counteracting

these fears. Moreover, while the international military presence to monitor the cease-fire and demobilization should have removed the real basis of such apprehensions born of wartime experiences, the role of nationalist political propaganda and fear-mongering in the mass media actually intensified after the peace agreement was signed. Multiple projects were initiated by international donors to establish independent media, and in September 1997, the international operatives actually used force to shut down transmissions from official Bosnian Serb media, on the grounds that the venom and falsehoods of their reporting posed a direct threat to the international troops. But in Sarajevo, the political leadership of the Bosnian Muslims claimed sovereign rights against interference by those wanting to establish an independent TV station, while in Herzegovina, the absence of any political opposition to the ruling Bosnian Croat party meant there were few, if any, groups wanting to provide alternative messages for the international community to assist.

In this atmosphere, a forced pace of reintegration across the three communities and of refugee returns to homes where one would be in a minority is bound to fail. Instead, an international commitment (including a military presence) to the Dayton goal of one state and to no change of borders for a minimum of five years would seem to be essential to any peaceful outcome. As analysis of decades of experience with third-party negotiated settlements to civil wars suggests, the success of the Dayton Accords as a definitive end to the Bosnian war has only a fifty-fifty chance, and that depends on the extent to which international assistance helps overcome the obstacles to cooperation that lie in this continuing fear, sense of vulnerability, and lack of trust among the parties.¹³ The primary determinant of success, in other words, does not lie with the agreement itself—for agreements are always compromises and general principles—but in the role of outsiders during the fragile period after a settlement is signed when parties need help to get beyond their fears of being at risk from former enemies and thus can cease thinking and acting solely in terms of their own protection. If they do not, the defensive psychology of each group only perpetuates the defenses of the others and the mentality of war.

Such a role requires those outsiders to be religiously impartial. The effect of the U.S.-sponsored train-and-equip program, however, is to recognize the fears of only one group. Bosnian Croats fear subordination in the federation to the more numerous Bosnian Muslims, even though they are also beneficiaries of this program. Bosnian Serbs, as the target of this military buildup, while being condemned for not being more willing to allow Muslim refugees to return to homes in the Republika Srpska, were kept in a defensive posture, fearful that the Dayton Accords were only a lull in a war being prepared under the patronage of a more activist U.S. policy toward Dayton implementation in mid-1997, which Serbs perceived as

explicitly pro-Muslim. By abandoning impartiality, even if they viewed Muslims as needing and deserving greater support, the United States intensified the fears among Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats that led them to prefer separation and to cooperate as little as possible in re-creating Bosnia. The logic behind the program, that peace required a self-defense capacity for Bosnian Muslims, even hinted that the primary patron of peace, the United States, did not believe in the political goal of the peace accord, that a common state for the three communities could be re-created, and that the fears of the minority groups were justified. It was as if they were preparing for partition.

Readiness for Reconciliation

The fear of becoming a minority in a state dominated by another nationality occupied most Bosnians in all three communities and was the primary source of popular support for nationalist leaders.¹⁴ As long as the accords or their implementation did little to allay these fears, efforts at individual forgiveness and reconciliation would not go very far. Even the heads of the four religious communities of Bosnia (Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish), brought together during 1997 in an internationally sponsored Inter-Religious Council to provide moral leadership for peace and reconciliation, appeared to be more concerned with consolidating singular control over their flocks and designing mutual pacts against proselytizing than with ecumenism.¹⁵

Advances could be made, however, by working first for change within each community where the risk of being a minority—as a political minority—and the issue of minority rights could be faced without the complicating national element. All three communities shared the need to develop legal guarantees, political channels for redress of grievances, and checks against clientelistic and one-party dominant politics. If each developed effective mechanisms for policing their own against intolerance, discrimination, and violations of human rights, then processes of cooperation across communities and even multiethnic reintegration would be likely to occur more naturally and faster.

The lack of political institutions to provide assurances was made worse, moreover, by the staging of the economic assistance program. Public opinion surveys repeatedly identified the same top priority for Bosnians of all three communities of finding employment and the income, status, and security associated with a job. By giving priority to large infrastructure and to building the financial institutions for a market economy and for cost recovery, the program inevitably was slow to develop new jobs other than those tied directly to the international presence. Economic insecurity, particularly in the Republika Srpska with its 90 percent unemployment,

and the continuing dependence of most Bosnians on officials (and thus party politicians) for access to jobs, housing, and relief were not likely to foster generosity and sharing with persons one had only recently fought. Because the bureaucratic rules of the EU, IMF, and the World Bank—the lead agencies in economic reconstruction—require these donors to work with counterparts who can provide guarantees, moreover, the aid program reinforced the political position of the three ruling nationalist parties whose interests were in consolidating national power, not in reconciliation.

*The Lack of Clarity in the Dayton-Prescribed
State and Its External Relations*

Peace and stability in Bosnia depend on its capacity to survive and function as a country. The viability of small states depends on two conditions: first, openness to global communications and trade and, therefore, effective relations with neighbors and the international community, including a macroeconomic capacity to regulate these external relations and open borders; and second, a government that can function. The fuzziness of the Dayton concept for a Bosnian political system raised institutional questions about that second aspect of viability, and it would be some time before those doubts would be answered. After elections required the formation of a government, for example, the special relations between the Bosnian Muslim leadership in Sarajevo and the donor community had to give way to more complex bargaining about who represented whom, or who represented Bosnia. Even more complex were the property issues, where the privatization process had first to resolve who had ownership rights over companies and activities that the Dayton map had divided among municipalities or entities. Yet the speed of both under pressure from outsiders gave advantages to persons who had waged the war and were able to leverage wartime power into peacetime election and control over the privatization process to perpetuate personal and party gain.

External relations were equally confusing. The U.S. negotiators insisted on three negotiating partners at Dayton: the leader of the Bosnian Muslim party, Bosnian President Izetbegovic, and the presidents of neighboring Croatia and Serbia. This was ostensibly to get the two presidents' public commitment to Bosnian sovereignty and their leverage over Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs to comply with the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, whenever the cooperation of either of these two was considered a problem, such as the refusal of Karadzic to cease political activity in the run-up to national elections in September 1996, U.S. diplomats flew to the neighboring capitals of Belgrade or Zagreb to demand compliance from Bosnian parties. The effect, along with the Dayton provisions for special relationships between the Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia and

between the federation and Croatia, was instead to continue to raise doubts about Bosnian sovereignty, particularly in the minds of Bosnian Muslims. Croatia even granted Bosnian Croats dual citizenship, with rights not only to vote in Croatian elections, but also to be represented with special seats in the Croatian parliament. The Bosnian Croat political party was a branch of the ruling party in Croatia. Many of the Bosnian Serb political parties were branches of parties in Serbia and engaged in frequent consultations. In fact, all three Bosnian parties continued to have external patrons and sources of support (for the Bosnian Muslims, these were the United States and a number of Islamic states in the Middle East and Asia, including Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey) that protected each from having to make the real political compromises necessary to one country and to working together. As for open borders, Croatia continued to keep its border with the Republika Srpska closed, preventing economic revival in the Banja Luka area, which depended on normalization of trade, although this was critical to the shift in U.S. policy during 1997 to speed implementation of Dayton by supporting a new Bosnian Serb leadership in the Banja Luka area as an alternative to hard-liners in Pale. At the same time, U.S. policy toward Serbia—maintaining an outer wall of economic sanctions until the separate problem of Kosovo and Albanian rights was solved, and insistence that political conditionality over economic aid did work to influence Bosnian Serbs—also imposed restraints on trade and produced a criminalization of border exchanges that did not contribute to Bosnian viability.

Conclusion: The Political Economy of Reconciliation

There should be no reason why a Bosnia partitioned into three areas could not remain one country, evolving over time from three nationally controlled parastates to three regions of a democracy with open borders. A single Bosnia composed of three national units is a compromise for all three parties that only awaits the emergence of political forces who want to make it one country. Such an evolutionary process would be composed of stages, beginning with an end to the uncertainty about Bosnia's political future and its citizens' rights of self-determination, a stage that the process of implementation has been prolonging unnecessarily. The first two years of peace building—the Dayton phase—could be seen as setting the stage for a new political contract for Bosnia, or for separation. Reassurances to those citizens who feel, even after two years of cease-fire, that the only protection is with their own national community and who fear that they will be forced to live in a minority position would have to be firmer. But by removing this uncertainty, radical nationalists would also lose influence, and nonpolitical processes of integration could begin.

Even more threatening to a sustainable peace than the electoral acclamation of nationalists responsible for the war that occurred in the September 1996 elections, and more or less in the municipal elections one year later, would be the consolidation of one-party states in each of the three areas. The idea that the greatest threat to individuals comes from members of other national groups is simply wrong. Keeping that threat alive keeps everyone on a war footing. The most important issues for citizens since the settlement are local, within their own community, over jobs, rights to housing, relations between original residents and the newcomers displaced by the war who wish to remain where they are (particularly the rural population now in the cities), and tensions between persons who stayed during the war and refugees returning from safe havens abroad. Greater focus on these issues would reorient the population and their leaders to the rigors of peace, and if the three national areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina are internally democratic and respect individual rights, then cross-unit political alliances, economic relations, and personal contacts can form and soften the internal borders.

From the point of view of international assistance in this process, however, the primary problem of peace in Bosnia appears to be that what needed to be done was not likely to happen. As Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo write on the basis of the El Salvador peace process, the question is, "Who will pay for the peace?"¹⁶

Of the various types of intervention and assistance, countries are most reluctant to send troops and risk lives to prevent wars. But once they intervene, ironically, they are most willing (and able) to pay for military deployments and aid, not for civilian tasks. Although the difficult stage of peace building follows the military separation of forces, when matters of internal security take prominence, countries are less willing to spare and finance police forces or to create an international gendarmerie that could be armed and replace costly soldiers.¹⁷ National interests remain strong in the giving of aid. Thus, for example, the U.S. energy behind the train-and-equip program for the Bosnian federation came increasingly from its own views of Iran, wanting to prevent Iran from gaining a toehold in Europe by substituting U.S. patronage of Bosnian Muslims. The most immediate delivery of tangible assistance came from bilateral aid (such as from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the British Overseas Development Agency, or the Swedish International Development Authority) that was available to communities located where that country's troops were stationed, which led to duplication in some cases and unnecessary neglect in others. Donors pay for projects that are visible, to gain political credit and foster national objectives, and that domestic legislatures will support, not necessarily what is needed to consolidate the peace. Members of the U.S.

Congress were adamant that refugees were not being allowed to return home fast enough at the same time that they refused to fund housing construction for their own homeless citizens. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe developed impressive programs for human rights to follow its work supervising elections, but the European Commission saw no reason to fund them. The phases of economic revival are determined not by the human stages of reconciliation, but by the programs for financial-sector reform and for cost recovery of banks that want (and need) to be repaid.

Opinion surveys of Bosnian citizens from all three communities during the first two years revealed overwhelming preferences for a job above everything else, and secondly for resolution of property issues for their apartment or house.¹⁸ Experience with other peace-building efforts emphasizes the necessity of disarmament and demobilization, although this experience also demonstrates that neither is possible until the main political issues have been resolved,¹⁹ and it emphasizes the need for time. The Bosnian peace process instead put strict deadlines on international commitment (renewing that commitment a year at a time), put assistance into economic stabilization and structural reform more than into local employment, and emphasized the transfer of indicted war criminals to The Hague and the vetting of police forces for accused war criminals, but it ignored the development of local judiciaries and criminal justice systems and sent in additional arms. While outsiders debated whether Bosnia was headed for multiethnic reintegration or for partition, they were not examining the role that they were contributing to this outcome and whether a different approach might be better.

If its first years of peace implementation demonstrate anything about the wider literature on peace settlements, then it is not a hurting stalemate among local parties but the ripeness of international patrons and powers that matters most in the decision to seek a negotiated peace. The necessity of partition after ethnically defined conflict is difficult to assess when the activities of the international negotiators, military forces, and civilian officials aiding the implementation of a peace agreement all reinforce the ethnic divisions of the population, the political system, and the distribution of jobs, housing, and other economic benefits. The peace process in Bosnia is being driven by the decisions of donors about what they are willing to finance, when, and how. Whether that includes activities that can lead to reconciliation and a sustainable peace was not clear in the first three years of peace, although comparison with what Bosnians say they need and with the experience in other cases of peace building after civil war suggest a major divide:²⁰ between the needs of peace and the goals of international actors in the process.

Notes

1. See I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Stephen John Stedman, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framework," in Frances M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991).

2. During the war, the leadership of the largest Bosnian Muslim political party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), decided to change the political name of its community from Muslim to Bosniac (*Bošnjak*). Many had resisted this for some time because its historical legacy was that of a pre-World War II party of the landed aristocracy and a post-1990 liberal, secular wing of the SDA that bolted to form a separate party. In changing to Bosniac, the SDA leadership hoped to provide a new identity for its constituency that was more closely associated with Bosnia and left open the political and religious connotations of being Muslim for postindependence debate. In this chapter, I choose for reasons of clarity, and of not prejudging political outcomes, to remain with the older designation, that Yugoslav constitutional identity of Muslim, and apologize for any offense given as a result.

3. Reflecting what was to become the dominant U.S. view, chief Dayton negotiator Richard Holbrooke writes in his memoirs of the Croatian (and later joint Croatian-Bosniac) offensives during the summer of 1995 that their success "was a classic illustration of the fact that the shape of the diplomatic landscape will usually reflect the balance of forces on the ground. In concrete terms, this meant that as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the battlefield" (*To End a War* [New York: Random House, 1998], p. 73).

4. Critical to this change in strategic balance were military events in neighboring Croatia in May and August, when the Croatian army overran the three (of four) United Nations protected areas in Croatia that bordered Bosnia and were populated by Croatian Serbs allied with Bosnian Serbs. The expulsion and flight of these Croatian Serbs deprived Serb towns in northern and western Bosnia of defensive protection and left them fully exposed to the Croatian juggernaut in September. The United States had facilitated this "assist" from Croatia, including a defense agreement signed in Split in July 1995 between the Bosnian president and leader of the SDA, Alija Izetbegovic, and the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, to legitimize the invasion, apparently viewing as of secondary concern the known Croatian ambitions to annex large parts of Bosnia as legitimate Croat territory.

5. See Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (summer 1997).

6. For the sake of accuracy, however, it is worth noting that in 1996-1997, all three communities obstructed the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, and until October 1997, the Bosnian Croats also refused to turn over their indicted war criminals to the tribunal. Thus, in practice, the denial of economic aid to the Bosnian Serbs on the grounds that they were not cooperating seemed motivated more by the prevailing emotion that Serbs were the most egregious offenders during the war.

7. It must be noted, however, that all federation ministries were headed by one Muslim and one Croat, with each ministry differing only in the nation holding its senior position. Thus, a Muslim deputy minister had to sign off on this education agreement.

8. See "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economic Issues and Priorities," discussion paper of the Central Europe Department of the World Bank, September 29, 1995, and its companion piece, "Rebuilding Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities for Recovery and Growth," both of which were prepared on the basis of meetings in Warsaw during the week of May 22, 1995, by representatives of the World Bank and of the wartime government. The first post-Dayton program, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities for Recovery and Growth," was issued jointly by the World Bank, the European Commission, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on December 8, 1995, for the first donors' conference, held in Brussels.

9. This was so until summer 1997, when a new U.S. policy of more assertive implementation of the accords, focused primarily on changing the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs toward politicians willing to cooperate with their implementation, declared military units of police to be covered by Annex 1A and in violation of the accords.

10. See Chaim Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 136-175; John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer: A Three-Way Partition Plan for Bosnia and How the U.S. Can Enforce It," *New Republic*, June 14, 1993, pp. 22-28; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," *New Republic*, December 18, 1995, pp. 16-21; and Robert Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," *Slavic Review* 55, no. 4 (winter 1996): 727-748.

11. Kaufman ("Possible and Impossible Solutions") is clearest on this.

12. See Xavier Bougarel, "Bosnia and Hercegovina: State and Communitarianism," in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair, and Rebirth* (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 98-99.

13. Barbara Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, December 1994, and "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (summer 1997).

14. On the "rationality" of these fears, however unrealistic they may be, see Rui deFigueiredo and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., *Civil War and the Security Dilemma* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), chap. 8.

15. This observation is based on visits of the four leaders to the United States, including presentations at the Catholic Bishop's Conference, Washington, D.C., May 21, 1998. The Inter-Religious Council was established in Sarajevo on June 9, 1997, "to promote inter-faith cooperation in the region" and as a "forum for issues affecting intercommunal relations"; the four leaders were Mustafa Cerić, the *reis-ul-ulema* of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Jacob Finčić, president of the Jewish community; Vinko Cardinal Puljić, archbishop of Sarajevo; and a representative of Serbian Patriarch Pavle.

16. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," *Foreign Policy* 94 (spring 1994): 87-102.

17. The need for such an international gendarmerie to assist in the Dayton implementation and fill the "security gap" between international military forces and the local police was recognized early, in large part by military commanders who did not want to take on civilian policing tasks, but it took another two years for the idea to be adopted by the PIC and NATO. Then, the difficulty of finding and funding this special unit, which would be assigned to the SFOR commander, delayed it further, so that six months after its creation, it had still not been deployed.

18. See the regular issues of *Opinion Analysis* from the United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, which are based on surveys commissioned from reputable Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian polling firms.

19. Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers, and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper No. 303 (London: Oxford University Press, August 1996).

20. See, for example, Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

Reflections on a Schizophrenic Peace

Dusko Doder

Where there is no vision, the people perish.

—*Book of Proverbs*

I have cried twice on assignment. Once in Beijing during the 1989 Tiananmen revolt when, in order to cover the story properly, my wife (also a journalist) and I sent our four-month-old son with a friend on a flight to Hong Kong to the safety of his grandparents' home. The second time was in the summer of 1996 in Bosnia as we interviewed Muslim women whose men had disappeared from Srebrenica a year earlier during the greatest bloodbath of the Yugoslav wars.

The second experience was more wrenching. How do you respond to a three-year-old girl still waiting for her father and brother to return, saving them daily scraps of food and dreaming of a magic wand to turn herself into a bird "so I could fly over the woods and find them"? The eyes of this girl's mother, Djeva, stared crazed from a gaunt face as she recalled the last moments—it was a scorching July 1995 day—before her husband and son were taken away by Bosnian Serb soldiers. "I know my son is alive," she declared. "A mother just knows."

The emotions of the Srebrenica survivors were tweaked each time—at first every few weeks, then months—some man turned up from hiding in mountain caves and thick forests, prolonging their deluded hopes. One survivor, Suljo Halilovic, thirty-six years old, arrived in Muslim-held Tuzla seven months after his wife had received word he was killed at Srebrenica. Their sixteen-year-old son, Amir, was still missing. Suljo, I suspect, was reconciled to the loss: separated from Amir in a Serb ambush, he had spent