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Democratic Transition
in Conflict-Torn Societies

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Governing Insecurity

Democratic Control of Military and Security
Establishments in Transitional Democracies

Edited by
GAVIN CAWTHRA and ROBIN LUCKHAM



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Abbreviations

ADF Allied Democratic Front	Affairs	Nationale du Katanga/Congo
AEPC Association of European Police Colleges	DFI Directorate of Foreign Intelligence	PLOT Front de Libération Contre l'Occupation du Territoire
AFCDRs Armed Forces Committees for the Defence of the Revolution	DII Directorate of Internal Intelligence	FRF Forces Républiques et Fédéralistes
AFDL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire	DINA National Intelligence Bureau	GDP Gross domestic product
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	DMI Directorate of Military Intelligence	GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme
AID Agency for Intelligence and Documentation	DoD Department of Defence	GLA Groupements Islamiques Armés
AIS Armée Islamique du Salut	DRC Democratic Republic of Congo	GNU Government of National Unity
ALC Armée de Libération Congolaise	DSP Presidential Special Division (Zaire)	HDI Human Development Index
ANC African National Congress	ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Group	HIDZ Croatian Democratic Union
ANC Congolese National Army	ECOWAS Economic Commu- nity of West African States	HIS Croatian Intelligence Services
APC All People's Congress Party	ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional	HR High Representative (UN)
APLA Azanian People's Liberation Army	EMP Estado Mayor Presidencial	HVIDRA Croatian Association of Veterans and Invalids of the Homeland War
ARD Alliance pour la Résistance Démocratique	EPRLF Eelam People's Revolu- tionary Liberation Front	ICTAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (US)
ARENA Aliança Renovadora Nacional	EROS Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students	ICTY International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia	ESCOR Economic and Social Committee on Overseas Research	IDP Internally displaced person
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina Investigation	ESTNA Centro de Estudios Estratégicas para la Estabilidad Nacional	IEBL Inter-Entity Boundary Line
BNI Bureau of National Investigation	EU European Union	IFIs International financial institutions
CDCC Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee	EZLN Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional	IFOR Implementation Force
CDF Civil defence force	FAC Forces Armées Congolaises	IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
CDRs Committees for the Defence of the Revolution	FALA Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola	IIS International Institute for Strategic Studies
CDSM Centre for Defence and Security Management	FAR Forces Armées Rwandaises	ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy
CEH Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico	PARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia	IMF International Monetary Fund
CID Criminal Investigation Department	PAZ Forces Armées Zaïroises	IPS Institute of Policy Studies
CNES Conseil National Économique et Social	FDD Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie	IPTF International Police Task Force
CNS La Conférence Nationale Souveraine	FFS Front des Forces Socialistes	IRC International Rescue Committee
CONADEP Comisión Nacional de Desaparecidos	FIS Front Islamique du Salut	ISS Institute for Security Studies
CP Communist Party	FLACSO Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences	ISU Internal Security Unit
CPDTP Commonwealth Police Department Task Force	FLEC Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave	ITAK Illanki Tamil Arasu Kadchi (Lanka Tamil State Party)
CWC Ceylon Workers' Congress	FLN Front de Libération Nationale	JMC Joint Military Commission
DDRR Demobilisation, disar- mament, repatriation and reintegration	FLN Front Rebel de Libération Nationale	
DFA Department of Foreign	FLNK/C Front de Libération	

In Whose Interest Is Security Sector Reform? *Lessons from the Balkans*

SUSAN L. WOODWARD

The end of the Cold War ordering of international politics and security created a global opportunity to shift resources from national defence to economic development and social welfare. But in some parts of the world this shift entailed far more than levels and sectoral targets of public expenditure. In south-eastern Europe, not only security structures but entire systems of government, economy and society had been structured around particular strategies of national defence for conditions that ceased to exist. International and regional security regimes and allies, socialist economies and one-party rule had to be transformed all at once. This was particularly the case of Albania and the former Yugoslavia, which had devised foreign relations, economic policies, political structures, and social relations to support a policy of military self-reliance outside the two Cold War military blocs. But it was also the case of Romania, which had tended more toward such independence after 1958 than not, with corresponding foreign and domestic policies, and of Bulgaria and Moldova, which had domestic systems completely defined by incorporation into a larger security environment (the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union) that had disappeared overnight.

This chapter examines the consequences when the conditions of both external and internal security differ from those on which donor-driven programmes of security sector reform and democratic accountability are based.

Preconditions of security sector reform

The experience of south-eastern Europe in the first post-Cold War decade suggests there are two elements necessary to security sector reform, neither of which has been present in the region thus far. The

first is the lesson of South Africa: the vital spark of fundamental internal political change to generate domestic interest in transforming the security sector and demilitarising state, economy and society. In no cases in south-eastern Europe had that special set of political conditions emerged by the end of 2001. While democratic accountability of security structures is not conceivable without democratisation, this precondition is not sufficient to generate domestic demands for reform. In fact, the process of democratisation can generate greater insecurity and a larger role for security forces of all kinds (Snyder 2000).

The second element is an external environment of relative security that makes both democracy and security sector reform possible. For many countries, including all of those in south-eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War created greater insecurity because its structure of international security collapsed and was not replaced by anything new. The result, at one extreme, was the violent break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, beginning in 1991 but not complete a decade later, and the regional instability and disruption that its wars and international response to those wars created. That regional instability then prevented what should have been a normal process, necessary to democratic consolidation, of establishing new trade and security relations for Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. Even if they had been able to distance themselves from the disputes over borders and new states, and they could not, the weakness of governments under these uncertain conditions made them vulnerable to the kind of violent involution that occurred in Albania in 1997, when the collapse of pyramid schemes provoked widespread revolt and looting of military arsenals, the total disintegration of discipline in the security forces (military and police), and a flood of arms and ammunition throughout the country. The violence between Transnistria and its parent republic, Moldova, was minor compared to the Yugoslav wars, but it stalled the creation of a new Moldovan state and the exit of foreign (Russian) military units from its soil. Nor did the end of the Cold War reduce the periodic threats of war between Greece and Turkey, facilitate a solution to the Cyprus conflict, or improve the ability of these two countries to follow through on repeated agreements to engage in reciprocal cuts in military budgets and armaments.

The difficulty facing projects for security sector reform in the Balkans and the analysis of trends in that direction is that these two preconditions or their absence – fundamental domestic change and external security – interact. This interaction creates an analytical difficulty, crucial to effective policy, in disentangling cause and effect, and it

produces a series of vicious circles that make any actual progress difficult to achieve. To get domestic demand for democratic accountability and reform of security structures, one needs a minimum of external security. Instead, the prevailing external insecurity, as a result of nationalist challenges to existing state borders and an absence of secure alliances and a regional or sub-regional security framework that would either prevent these challenges or provide mechanisms for managing them politically, confronts governments with very real needs that make it difficult to argue for cuts in defence.

Under conditions of new democracies, moreover, such insecurity advantages politicians who choose to gain popularity, win votes and remain in power by generating and exploiting fear and insecurity and by offering protection against dangerous others, both at home and across the border. Even for those who avoid militaristic appeals, the high levels of inchoate or explicit threats to the state and the new regime make control over the security forces – military and police – a critical domestic resource. The emergence of democratic competition for power will include partisan competition over the loyalty of and control over the armed forces and internal security forces, and whatever rhetoric such competition provokes.

For individual citizens, moreover, according to public opinion polls in the region, the role of the armed forces is far less important than a new form of insecurity unknown for nearly fifty years, the meteoric rise in their own physical and economic insecurity. The economic and political transformations have generated high unemployment, rising prices for necessities, a dramatic end to generous systems of social welfare, and weak states that appear incapable of providing minimal public protection and public goods. At the same time, these consequences of the transition are exacerbated by external insecurity and regional instability because of the continuing requirements for defence spending, the obstacles to intra- and cross-regional trade, criminalised economies, low tax yields and fiscal capacity, and the deterrents to foreign investment.

To the extent there are any limits on this complex insecurity and its vicious circles, the 'controls' do not yet come from democratic government, but from temporary policies of foreign actors – for example, the presence of NATO troops in two international protectorates (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo), in Macedonia to assist implementation of an internationally mediated constitutional revision, and in Albania, Croatia and Hungary for the logistical needs of these three deployments. The demand for security sector reform within countries is also coming from outsiders, either as part of conditions for further

economic assistance (such as cuts in public budgets) or through myriad programmes of military and police assistance aimed at creating peace and stability in the region. Yet all of these external actions are governed by a policy of *containment* – by the European Union, NATO, the OSCE, the United States, among others – aimed at protecting their prosperous democracies against the effects of the region's instability: refugees and internally displaced persons; organised crime and trafficking in drugs, persons and arms; and threats of further war to the neighbourhood. The result, according to Bulgarian sociologist Ivan Krastev, is a situation of 'controlled insecurity' promoted by the international community, from which an exit is difficult to imagine (Krastev 2000: 8).

Background to current instability

Between June 1991 and June 1999, the region saw four wars – in Slovenia, in Croatia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina (though one might identify here at least two wars, between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, later a Croat-Muslim alliance), and in Yugoslavia (Serbia and its province of Kosovo). Deadly violence also accompanied the effort by Transnistria to set up an independent state rather than remain in Moldova, and the collapse of the pyramid schemes in Albania in 1997. A fifth war, by Albanian nationalists from Kosovo and Macedonia against the Macedonian state, began in February 2001, but appears to have been cut short by EU and NATO intervention. Borders throughout the region remain unsettled and challenged by one or more groups. Millions of persons remain refugees or internally displaced, unable to go home.

At the same time, all governments in the region are now elected in competitive, multi-party elections. Each has had at least one turnover in power. Since 2000, with the first turnover after 1990 in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, all parliaments are active places of contestation and law making. Constitutionally, all security forces are responsible to civilian authorities, and the process of economic reform and transformation generates additional reasons for transparency and accountability in military, police, and intelligence matters. Nowhere can one say, however, that democratic governance has been consolidated (with the possible exception of Bulgaria) or that the prevailing insecurity in the region might not yet win out against consolidation. Pockets of frozen instability and stalemate, as is suggested by the circumstances in Moldova and Bosnia-Herzegovina, could generalise to the region as well. Attempting to pursue security sector reform in such conditions of

fundamental systemic transformation and profound human and state insecurity requires a conceptual framework quite distinct from that normally underlying the sectoral aid policies of development donors.

Such a framework would have to take into account that it was precisely these three current processes – democratisation, economic reform, and constitutional change, including the role of the armed forces – that caused the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What will make the difference in this second effort? Many other countries in the world, including a large number of those that appear in this volume, confront the same set of interacting processes in conflict-torn environments. Understanding the tensions that must be managed as a result of the interaction of democratisation, economic liberalisation, and changes in the constitutional role of the security forces is a necessary first step to a conceptual framework that could apply far beyond the Balkans.

(1) The tension between liberalising economic reform under an IMF-led debt repayment programme and democratising political reform

This tension drove the political dynamic in Yugoslavia in the 1980s that led to the end of socialism and the country's dissolution in 1990–1. In contrast to the policy of the United States and the international financial institutions, which view economic reform and democratisation as complementary, these two processes tend far more often to be in conflict. These tensions are both institutional and distributive.

The primary institutional tension is between centralisation and decentralisation. First, the goal of IMF economic reform packages in exchange for loans – an open, globally participant economy – requires certain conditions and institutional capacity for effective macroeconomic policy, such as a national market, central powers over monetary and foreign exchange policies including an independent central bank, uniform policies on laws affecting economic transactions (property rights, tax legislation, etcetera), and fiscal discipline that limits government expenditures and regulatory powers. Yet such liberalisation tends to weaken governmental capacity in general, especially in poorer countries, at the very moment when a transition from war or authoritarian rule requires the opposite, to build up an effective and legitimate state. Liberalisation reduces the powers and resources available for effective development policy and the public investments necessary to capital goods and infrastructural reconstruction. It hits hard at prevailing rules of the political game in many poorer countries by squeezing resources that can be used

to co-opt potential rivals or opponents of economic reforms, including regional politicians with autonomist demands. And it eliminates the fiscal resources for public services and social welfare that might prevent serious social unrest and build legitimacy for the new regime. At the same time, standard IMF programmes and the economists who design them insist that the best method for reducing such public expenditures and fiscal deficits is not temporary cuts but fiscal and administrative decentralisation. This not only reduces further the powers of the central government to manage transition but it also generates and exacerbates resource conflicts between central and regional governments at a time when the simultaneous shift to export-oriented economic policy increases regional inequalities and accompanying regional grievances with the centre.

The distributive conflicts, for their part, are particularly severe in the early stages of these reforms when new democracies are unusually fragile and opponents of reform particularly strong. The first stages of macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment policies introduce serious austerity, rising unemployment often accompanied by inflation, the increases in regional inequality mentioned above, and the obvious political consequences of these economic hardships. These conditions are particularly fertile for politicians who want to gain popular support through populist appeals to ethnic, religious, or sectarian differences and antagonisms that have a territorial base, because the distributive consequences intensify not only vertical but horizontal inequalities. In the early stages of democratisation, the political loyalties, identities, and organisations suited to electoral competition will be weakly institutionalised, giving advantage to those who can call on communal symbols and bonds in mobilising substantial popular discontent.

Discontent over economic austerity and distributional inequalities exacerbates the institutional tension between the simultaneous pressures for greater central powers over the economy and greater local autonomy to adapt to new economic conditions. Thus, the politics of economic reform and the politics of democratisation interact to the advantage of politicians choosing communal legitimisation in elections or in the centre-regional contest and a dynamic tending toward autonomist and even secessionist demands, even if only intended initially as a bargaining tactic. In the Yugoslav case, the break-up began with such threats from the Slovene government (the wealthiest of the six republics) in a contest over terms of the IMF policy (especially Slovene opposition to devaluation, wage freezes, and recentralisation of monetary policy) and over federal expenditures and transfers.

Despite this disintegrative dynamic, few countries have a choice to refuse the conditions of assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, given the current international monetary and trading regimes, the foreign debt of conflict-torn and transitional societies which must be addressed before any other aid is forthcoming, and the initial dependence on foreign capital for economic reconstruction. Nor is there much support for the choice made by the newly industrialising countries of East Asia, to abandon democratic reforms when the two processes conflict.

(2) The effect of constitutional reform in countries that are multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multilingual, and federal

Both economic reform and democratisation occur through constitutional change and legal reform of a fundamental character (such as the nature of property rights). The former Yugoslavia is far more typical, in its heterogeneous character, of most countries undergoing economic reform and democratisation than are those often cited as successful cases of transformation, such as Hungary or Poland. In Yugoslavia, the federal question – that is, the rights of the republics (federal units) versus those of the central government, particularly over economic assets (tax policy, federal expenditures, property rights, foreign exchange policy, and so on) – was the driving focus of all constitutional change. When constitutional change included early stages of democratisation, it compounded the federal question by adding the issue of balance in the central government between parliamentary and executive power. Politicians from republics that favoured less central power and greater states' rights demanded parliamentary supremacy, while those who preferred greater central power or depended on a continuation of fiscal redistribution tended to favour the executive branch. But democratisation also meant that politicians began to seek popular support for their positions and thus to debate the constitutional issues publicly. Operating in a vacuum of democratic institutions and institutional interests, politicians exploited rhetoric that asserted patterns of association between certain institutional and constitutional arrangements and perceived ethnic and religious discrimination in the past.

Even in South Africa, constitutional reform could have had the effect we saw in Yugoslavia had the disputes between the new African National Congress (ANC) government and Inkatha in KwaZulu-Natal, including the role of President Buthelezi, not been resolved in the way they were. The collapse of Yugoslavia was not inevitable; political choices could have been made, as in South Africa, to escape the spiral of

dissolution. But other transitional democracies that are multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multilingual, and divided into administrative regions (whether technically federal or not), such as Nigeria, Russia and Indonesia, are still navigating these dangerous waters.

(3) The role of the army and its evolution under democratisation and economic transformation

A crucial element of democratisation is the evolution of the armed forces as an institution whose constitutional responsibility had been to secure not only the country's territorial integrity but also a particular political regime. In the case of Yugoslavia, the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (the federal Yugoslav Peoples' Army, or JNA) had an external role that was tied to the Cold War order, to defend the country against attack from both the Warsaw Pact forces and NATO forces, and also an internal role, to defend its socialist regime and the legacy of its anti-fascist liberation in the Second World War. This internal role included organisational representation equivalent to that of a state in the federation in both the federal presidency (a collective body of nine – eight territorial regions and the armed forces) and the collective presidency of the party (League of Communists). To implement successively harsher IMF loan programmes during the 1980s, federal budget cuts required ever steeper cuts in the military budget. Arguments from the general staff that to reduce military expenditures, modernisation had to occur that was initially *more* expensive did not fall on receptive ears in the wealthier republics that paid higher (in absolute terms) federal tax. At the same time, the autonomist, secessionist and nationalist rhetoric surrounding the constitutional reform battle challenged the army's constitutional obligations – to defend the multinational and anti-nationalist values of the country and the country's territorial integrity. As political parties began to organise in the late 1980s on anti-communist (and in some cases neo-fascist) grounds, the very origins of the army itself came under attack. In many ways, the armed forces itself became a core issue in the politics of economic reform.

On one hand, the politics of economic reform and rebellion against the federal system, particularly by the Slovenes, focused on the federal army. Although the issues of economic interest to the republican government were more about monetary and labour policy, the size of the military budget, the language rights of conscripts in the army, and the policy of arms exports were easier political targets to mobilise popular support for republican rights and, eventually, independence. By 1989–90, in the neighbouring Croatian republic, nationalists viewed the very

disintegration of the federal army as the necessary critical step on their road to independence.

On the other hand, military officials also had to adjust, simultaneously, to budget cuts, fundamental changes in both external and internal threats to the state, and democracy, in the sense that persons previously considered enemies of the state were now being elected in the republics. Moreover, the concept of civilian control under these new conditions meant a surfeit of competing civilian demands without clear constitutional guidelines. The federal army's effort to protect the constitutional order and the country's borders, under contradictory political direction, was confused, messy, and in the end subject to a condemnation wide enough to include the creation of an international criminal tribunal in The Hague.

The result, as Croatian nationalists had planned, was the army's disintegration into national units, its transformation into instruments of civilian nationalists and their independence goals or subordination to armed units of the internal security police (favoured by new leaders over the army, which retained some professional integrity), and a proliferation of paramilitaries and arms dealers from within and outside the area.

The democratic era

With few exceptions (Slovenia, no longer even considered a part of the region, and probably Bulgaria), the first decade of democratic government in south-eastern Europe, 1990–2000, was actually an era of state formation. The contest to build new, post-communist states was largely a contest within elite factions over *who* would shape that state and become the new political class. As nominally democratic states, the primary resource was popular legitimacy, and the critical contest was over definitions of the political community each claimed to represent. Who belonged and who did not, and what was the political identity and focus of political loyalty of that community?

This process of new state formation has included massive expulsions of populations on the basis of (imputed) ethnic loyalties and presumed disloyalty, and the violent prevention of their return home through murder, arson, organised mobs, and the destruction of new homes by grenades or bombs. Even in Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, where expulsions were not a contest over new state borders as in the former Yugoslav cases, threats of expulsion and actual violence accompanied debates about whom the post-socialist *nation* included and did not. Nor was this process complete by 2002.

A critical element of state formation was a struggle for control over state security forces and the creation of paramilitary organisations attached to political parties. An integral part of political competition was arrests of political enemies, of ruling personalities, assassinations of journalists, rivals and critics, hyperactivity in domestic surveillance by intelligence services, and the generalised threat to civilian security posed by the presence of special forces in major capitals (such as Belgrade). Presidents Tudjman in Croatia, Berisha in Albania, Milošević in Serbia, all three nationalist leaderships in Bosnia–Herzegovina, and even, latterly, Djukanović in Montenegro, all supplemented their electoral victories with special police units, particularly militarised units of the internal security police (in Serbia, for example, the numbers in 2000 were 140,000, or three and a half times their size in the socialist period), special guards (such as Tudjman's *Gardijske Brigade*), three separate intelligence services allied with nationalist political parties in Bosnia–Herzegovina, and, it appears, a revived Communist-era secret police in Romania and Albania.

The process of state formation was also intimately intertwined throughout the region with organised crime and its associated elements of gang warfare, violent settling of accounts, and attacks on political figures (Strazzari: 2001). The line between party competition, protection rackets, and police-organised pogroms was often thin indeed. These conditions, and a lawlessness more characteristic of frontier conditions than democratising states, were exacerbated by the Yugoslav wars and international response. The economic sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in May 1992, the two economic embargoes imposed on Macedonia by Greece, the influx of international military forces, and the open violation of the UN arms embargo by the USA and others to assist those fighting against Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo created ideal conditions for smugglers and trafficking in cigarettes, fuel, persons (enslaved children, female prostitutes, Asian and Middle Eastern migrants seeking asylum or work in western Europe), drugs, weapons, and ammunition. Even nationalist contests contained a strong dose of competition over smuggling routes and the revenues such control entailed.

The consequence of an environment with extremely high unemployment, widespread availability of small arms, and thousands engaged in some small part in the trafficking networks is that the daily incidence of ordinary robbery, theft, and violent crime is unusually high. Even the former president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, nearly lost his life in an attempted assassination that most consider the result of competition

between criminal gangs in Macedonia and Bulgaria and efforts by the Macedonian government to crack down.

Whereas the economic activities and causes of this criminality and political corruption gain most attention, Bulgarian sociologist Ivan Krastev's research suggests that the primary cause is the failure of the state to provide basic security: there is a search by individuals, families, and businesses for private solutions, and bribes turn out to be primarily to private security services, protection rackets and other means of safety (Krastev: personal communication). In fact, most *governments* in the region are buying protection from external actors – from NATO, the UN, EU police assistance, and private security companies such as the US-based Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI).

The lesson of the first decade of democratisation in south-eastern Europe is that eventual consolidation of democracy, improved civilian control over security, and increasing security overall are not guaranteed. Particularly if democratisation is an instrument of new state formation, the opposite trend is more likely. At best, the trend has not been one of linear progress. Competitive elections became instruments in some places such as Croatia and Serbia to legitimise arbitrary power, creating 'democratically legitimated dictatorship' as Croatian sociologist Vesna Pusić characterised the regime of President Franjo Tudjman and his party, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) (Pusić 1994). Nationalist projects were used to justify *de facto* emergency rule in some cases, and even countries on an upward track for much of the decade, such as Albania and Macedonia, saw serious reversals after 1996–7.

For example, democratic elections and national independence in Croatia ushered in a decade of autocratic rule by President Tudjman and his family circle, with effective governance in the hands of an extra-parliamentary (and extra-constitutional) organ, the National Security Council chaired by Tudjman's son. Tudjman's government ignored international commitments made, such as the ceasefire signed through UN mediation in November 1991 and January 1992, and launched a military onslaught against UN peacekeeping troops and Serb inhabitants in three UN-protected areas in May and August 1995. The Croatian government, in fact, used the signing of the ceasefire to build up, train and equip its military forces, to assist Bosnian Croat forces, and to aid others in the wider region who might open new fronts against Serbs. Public expenditures on defence remained inordinately high at 60 per cent of the central budget (itself consuming 55 per cent or higher of GDP), and much more 'off-budget', and the army, police and paramilitary forces were actively engaged in domestic politics.

In Serbia, despite regular elections and, until the late 1990s, relative freedom of speech, association and employment, the government became increasingly autocratic, engaging in selective police terror and state-directed assassinations of independent voices. In this case, the cause was primarily international isolation and sanctions, which made economic activity so risky that it was increasingly overtaken by those who would bear the risks – smugglers and their complex of illegal operations, including kickbacks to politicians and protection from the police – and eventually led to criminalisation of the state and revenue sources as well. Most important in terms of security sector reform was the effect of the NATO bombing campaign, Operation Allied Force, against Serbia in March–June 1999, because it ended the decade-long effort by the army to adjust to democratic principles while retaining professional integrity, against persistent government demands to act domestically. The NATO campaign gave Milošević the excuse to replace the army chief of staff with a more compliant chief and made the army's responsibility for defending the country's borders an internal fight, in Kosovo.

The lack of linear progress is even clearer in Macedonia. Independence began with a successful negotiation between the chief of the federal Yugoslav army and the President of Macedonia to allow peaceful withdrawal of the remaining federal troops, with their equipment, in early 1992. The government committed itself to building a small defence force appropriate to post-Cold War conditions. But its southern neighbour, Greece, refused to recognise that independence and held up European Union and American recognition until the end of 1995. Turkey countered with recognition and a pact for military assistance, and President Gligorov persuaded the UN Security Council, in December 1992, to deploy a preventive force of UN peacekeeping troops along its northern and western borders as an implicit security guarantee. Although this signal of commitment to Macedonian independence enabled the government to focus on economic reform and democratisation, it could not protect Macedonia from the devastating economic effects of the sanctions on Serbia, its primary trading partner (two-thirds of its economy was tied to Serbia in 1991), including increasing criminalisation, corruption of border guards and police, the violence that accompanies competition over smuggling routes, and the shift southward, through Macedonia, of the Balkan route for drug and other illegal trafficking by organised crime from Asia to Western Europe. Nor could the UN border monitors protect Macedonia against the activities of militant Albanian nationalists who, while focusing on Kosovo, also chose assassination targets in Macedonia, ran cross-border illegal activities in arms,

drugs and guerrillas, and led to a new front in Macedonia itself in early 2001. Indeed, the NATO military preparations for action against Serbia, beginning in the autumn of 1998 and culminating in the air campaign, led to the removal of the UN force, leaving Macedonia vulnerable to new uncertainties about its border and external security and a temporary influx of Kosovo refugees that burst the fragile internal bargaining over intercommunal relations and its constitutional order. NATO took control of strategic communications in Macedonia and its border, and in the course of 2001 deployed its own force in Macedonia to oversee the terms of an EU/US-negotiated constitutional reform to satisfy the Albanian minority and disarm a portion of the Albanian militants. The Albanian insurgency of 2001 raised serious questions about the extent of democratic consolidation in Macedonia, while its security sector reform never took off because of the massive external, and eventually internal, threats that arose.

These vacillations, reversals, and deterioration in the countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia can be understood in the light of the break-up of a state, but Albania also illustrates the non-linear path of democratisation in the Balkans. Despite enthusiastic Western reception for the first democratically elected government of President Sali Berisha, his regime had by 1996 become increasingly buttressed by the former secret police and by money laundering through pyramid schemes. His nationalist support for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in northern Albania included weapons trafficking and training camps. When the pyramid schemes collapsed in 1997, the lack of discipline by the country's security forces forced Western countries to deploy a temporary security force (Operation Alba led by Italy under an OSCE mandate). Forced by the intervention into extraordinary elections, President Berisha chose to increase insecurity as a campaign tactic, including local shoot-outs and looting of army arsenals. Despite this dramatic collapse of internal security and democratisation and a continuing fragility worsened by organised crime networks throughout the country, the country has apparently returned to its prior path of peaceful democratisation, economic reform and European integration.

In addition to the insecurities unleashed by state formation in an uncertain, undefined external environment and the violence, arbitrary rule, and deterioration of security that has characterised democratisation (in contrast to the socialist era) in the Balkans, a third characteristic of this first decade is a region dotted by pockets of frozen instability that are strikingly similar to the negative African scenarios described by participants in this project. Moldova, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and

even Serbia–Montenegro are all trapped in a half-way house of insecurity that one might call a negative equilibrium. That is, external policies toward these entities favour containment while ruling élites benefit economically from the rents, kickbacks, and smuggling profits that such unstable, unregulated environments encourage. Crisis management by relevant European and international actors and personal interest in the agendas that produce such crises among political leaders can perpetuate such a situation for a long time. And the more interventions lead to fragile political compromises or the creation of temporary sub-state 'entities' that do not have sovereign rights or responsibilities, the more democratisation is delayed and regional instability continues.

Security sector reform

This picture of insecurity in south-eastern Europe has a lot in common with West Africa, particularly as described by Comfort Ero in her contribution on Sierra Leone. There is one major difference – the overriding international presence and role in the Balkans. This international role has two motivations. The first is regional peace and security in Europe, and the second is the economic transformation of the region from socialist regimes to liberal market economies. The first motivation has generated a host of engagements and policies throughout the decade aimed at crisis management, war termination, the provision of a 'secure environment' for two United Nations-mandated international administrations (in Bosnia–Herzegovina and in Kosovo) to build peace and local self-governance, and campaigns against corruption, organised crime, illegal migration and trafficking in drugs and persons so as to interrupt the flows into Western Europe. The second motivation comes from creditors and donors who have programmes of economic reform and transformation, developmental assistance and post-conflict reconstruction premised on the belief in liberalisation and privatisation as prime motors of economic growth. In policies to reduce public expenditures and the public sector, the defence sector is a prime early target. The result of both motivations is an extensive array of efforts aimed at reforming security apparatuses, from militaries to police and border regimes, and at generating democratic accountability. Only examples can illustrate such a vast array.

The first explicit effort at security sector reform (1994–5) was the retraining and equipping for 'democratic reform' of the Croatian army by MPRI, a private American security firm on contract to the US Department of State. The programme was designed to transform what it

called a 'Soviet-style' army into a Western (American-type) professional force subordinated to civilian control. The result was two massive military offensives by the Croatian army against three UN-protected areas and their Serb inhabitants in 1995. The role of MPRI – first in Croatia, then in administering the Train and Equip programme for the Federation army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, next in training and equipping the KLA (although not the only actor so engaged) and finally, when an offshoot of the KLA began an insurgency in Macedonia, in working with the Macedonian military – did not help to win friends or erase suspicions about Western interest in military reform.

The relation between democratisation and security sector reform, moreover, is indirect. In Croatia, the MPRI programme for democratic accountability of the army meant little during the Tudjman era, despite periodic elections. When the opposition parties won, after Tudjman's death in December 1999, one of their first acts in power was to announce plans for serious cuts in the military budget. But the cause was an economic crisis due to the corruption and flawed economic reforms of the Tudjman regime and the deep cuts in public expenditures required by new World Bank and IMF loan programmes. Even then, the agonizingly slow progress of restructuring and reform of the armed forces in the following two years suggest that the real aim was the symbolic signalling of a new foreign policy. Under international scrutiny, to prove more cooperative than Tudjman had been in his commitments to the Dayton Agreement, the government cut subsidies to the Bosnian Croat army such as the funding of military officers' salaries. The crisis this provoked in the Bosnian federation (over these funds, a new defence law, and Bosnian Croat militancy), moreover, demonstrates that reform of the external security sector by definition will always have external effects. In Croatia two years later, little if any downsizing or cuts in military expenditures have occurred, although some transparency and a reduction in off-budget expenditures can be claimed. Moreover, the decision of the new government to purchase F-16 airplanes from the United States after the new President and Prime Minister visited Washington in the summer of 2000 occurred without public debate or discussion about an appropriate national security strategy for the future, including what possible use Croatia would have for F-16s.

Public debate on military matters occurred instead in reaction to the government's efforts to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague in providing evidence and extraditing Croatian military officers indicted for war crimes in the wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite high-profile

cooperation by the Croatian president, Stipe Mesić, and a judge in Rijeka, the Prime Minister and his cabinet back-pedalled in response to massive demonstrations by nationalist right-wing parties and veterans' groups, with the blessing of Catholic Church bishops. Growing pressure from the prosecutor in The Hague to extradite officers provoked three ministers from the second-largest party in the coalition, the centre-right Social Liberals, to resign their posts in protest, and the party's leader, a leading contender for President, to step down. Even revelations of massive corruption in the military could not overcome the public turmoil surrounding ICTY demands to mobilize popular demand for reform. For Croatian nationalists, the army created in the 'National Homeland War' was beyond reproach, inseparable from the Croatian nation itself and the formation of its independent state.

The most extensive efforts at security sector reform have occurred in the two territories that are currently international protectorates, Bosnia-Herzegovina¹ and Kosovo. In fact, national security in both instances is provided by foreign troops – the NATO-led military operations, IFOR/SFOR and KFOR respectively. Negotiations over and terms of implementation of agreements on arms control and limitations for Bosnian armed forces (and those of neighbouring Croatia and Yugoslavia as co-signators) were mandated by the peace accord and conducted in Vienna under the OSCE, while downsizing (discharging 200,000 soldiers) and reintegration (funded by the World Bank) were conducted by IFOR. Similarly, in Kosovo, KFOR supervised the transformation of the KLA into a Kosovo Protection Corps responsible, ostensibly, for civilian protection in areas of disaster preparedness along the lines of the French *Securité Civile*. In both areas, the private security firm MPRI trained and equipped the two anti-Serb armies, the KLA and the Bosnian Federation army, while NATO officials worked (unsuccessfully by 2002) to integrate the two Bosnian armies into one.

Equipment came to Bosnia from the United States and Islamic states. International officials charged with implementing the peace agreement required the creation of a central government Standing Committee on Military Matters as the first step toward a single national security policy (the Dayton Agreement gave jurisdiction over defence to the two entities, the Federation and the Serb Republic, not to their common state). Numerous bilateral (British in particular) and multilateral (NATO) programmes have sought to persuade and educate Bosnians to design national defence and security plans. Professionalisation, reform and democratic supervision (by parliament and non-governmental organizations) of the militaries have been the subject of frequent training

seminars under the Office for Regional Stabilisation of the OSCE that has responsibility for implementing Annex 1B of the Dayton Agreement. By July 1999, members of the triune presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina were pressured by international officials to agree to cut the military budget by 15 per cent and to make a symbolic display of unity on defence by announcing the decision at the inaugural summit of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe in Sarajevo. At 41 per cent of domestically financed public revenue in the Bosnian Federation and 20 per cent in Republika Srpska, in neither case counting external assistance (substantial in the case of the Federation), defence expenditures were judged the main obstacle to domestic generation of economic growth.

In both Bosnia and Kosovo, police training and reform are also extensive, down to the creation of police academies, the vetting of all persons who apply for employment in the police forces, the obligation of 'multi-ethnic' composition, and the provision of new uniforms (and their design), all managed by United Nations civilian police units (the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and UNCIVPOL in Kosovo).² UN police also monitor local police and provide domestic security. Rules on the legal possession of firearms are enforced by IFOR and KFOR, amounting to daily seizures (and occasional raids) in the case of Kosovo. Judiciaries are being massively reformed and restructured by international direction in both cases, although progress is far too slow for the tasks they must handle. In both cases, the indictment, arrest and trial of persons accused of war crimes and investigation of mass graves and alleged massacres is a major international preoccupation, with daily media attention led by the ICTY in The Hague. In addition, international donors to Slovenia, Bosnia and Kosovo design and fund de-mining programmes (including a United Nations Mine Action Centre in both areas). There is generous EU assistance throughout the region to border police for training, cross-border cooperation and communication, and equipment.

Three other international interventions to end civil violence in the region also imposed temporary security by foreign troops and focused efforts to create or reform modern police units. The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia (UNTAES) implemented a peace accord (the Erdut Agreement) from 1995 to 1997, providing border monitoring, demobilisation and the creation of multi-ethnic police units. When political authority over eastern Slavonia returned to Croatia and UNTAES departed, a police monitoring mandate (given to a United Nations Police Support Group) was considered necessary for a nine-month transition period. In October 1998, an OSCE mission and an

office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights were established to continue monitoring Croatian activity toward the Serb minority. In Albania, a coalition of European states deployed Operation Alba in summer 1997 as a security presence in the lead-up to elections after the anarchy provoked by the collapse of pyramid schemes. Some units remain. The West European Union (WEU) then deployed police units to instigate police training under a programme still in place called MAPE. NATO had a heavy presence in Albania and Macedonia during the preparation for and running of Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia (24 March–10 June 1999), and many NATO units remain as part of the logistical tail for KFOR in both countries. In the summer of 2001, NATO deployed 4,500 soldiers under British command to Macedonia in Operation Essential Harvest to collect weapons (more than 3,300) from National Liberation Army guerrillas, and it followed this operation with a Macedonian Security Force of 1,000 under German command to be a security presence during implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement between the Macedonian government and Albanian political parties which the Macedonian parliament adopted in November.

In Montenegro, although it was nominally part of a single state with Serbia (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), NATO countries proposed and enabled the creation of a separate police force through training, equipping and finance as a deterrent counterweight to Yugoslav army units deployed in the republic. Its goal was to send a signal to the Milošević government that the West would support Montenegrin independence against any moves by the Yugoslav army, should it be necessary. This example demonstrates that some security sector reform programmes have actually been used as vehicles of political revolution, with negative effects for their popular credibility.

Beyond these temporary engagements to stabilise the Balkans, the European Union has increasingly focused assistance and policies, particularly through its office of Justice and Home Affairs, on the perceived threat to Western European security of the trafficking routes for drugs, the sex trade, illegal migrants and asylum seekers that traverse the Balkans. This longer-term attention is on police, customs, judicial and governance reforms. The EU has also designed association agreements for countries in south-eastern Europe called Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) that contain additional requirements and preconditions addressed to stability-related political criteria as well as conformity with standard membership requirements. In addition, all countries in the region aspire to NATO membership, beginning with Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO's Membership Accession Plan (MAP).

In June 1999, recognition that peace required a regional strategy and cooperation between and among states in south-eastern Europe even led the EU and other interested states (the US, Russia, Canada, Norway and others) and organisations (such as the OSCE, World Bank and UN) to create a new facility called the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe. Its role was to facilitate the financing of specific projects and multiple forums for regular communication on issues of the Pact's focus as a parallel, complementary process to that of European integration. One of the three working tables of the Stability Pact, Working Table III, specialises in security, with two sub-tables: justice and home affairs, and defence and security.³ Its projects include arms control, non-proliferation and military contacts; defence reform and economics, including budgetary transparency and base closings and conversions; humanitarian de-mining; small arms and light weapons; disaster preparedness and prevention; two institutionalised regional initiatives, one to fight corruption and the other to fight organised crime; asylum and migration; trafficking in human beings; and reforms of judiciary, civilian police and border police. At the fourth meeting of Working Table III in June 2001, the sub-table on defence and security chose to focus future efforts on 'security sector reform'. Even World Bank programmes for economic development in countries of the region, such as for Kosovo, Bosnia and Yugoslavia, give priority in their design to stability and security (Gligorov 2000).

Thus, Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia are all engaged in reforming their militaries as a result of membership in NATO's PfP and under the rules of MAP. NATO and the EU have encouraged them to create regional security forums, such as the South-east Europe Initiative, the Consultative Forum, and the South-east Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP). Unfortunately, the Albanian insurgency in Macedonia, beginning in February 2001, escalated just as the government signed an SAA with the EU. Security sector reform and trade opportunities were interrupted by military and police counterinsurgency operations and skyrocketing military expenditures, while public antagonism towards NATO, high as a result of the campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, worsened dramatically. And to forestall an economic crisis, the government chose to impose a special tax for military operations.

Finally, even in Moldova, the primary security threat – the possibility that fighting might again erupt between Chisinau and its separatist region of Transnistria – is managed by outsiders. According to a ceasefire agreement of June 1992, the internal border between Moldova and Transnistria is controlled and supervised by Russian troops and

Ukrainian monitors (as the two Guarantors of the ceasefire), together with some Moldovan and Transnistrian units. Relations between the two capitals occur through the mediation of a resident mission of the OSCE, and Moldova is attempting to balance the Russian troop presence and the failure of Russia to dismantle its remaining (Soviet-era) bases and armaments with negotiations to join NATO, beginning with Partnership for Peace. In mid-2001, it was accepted into the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe.

These examples of externally provided security and pressure for restructuring of the security sector in the region only scratch the surface of the myriad projects and activities of bilateral and multilateral, country-specific and pan-regional programmes. An American initiative under Austrian leadership, the South-east European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), for example, has done much on border management – creating and training border police and customs officials and facilitating cross-border cooperation. INTERPOL and EUROPOL are active in the region. In addition to the UN police reform programmes and the EU's MAPE in Albania, more than twenty separate bilateral programmes are running on police and border management, including those of the US's ICITAP, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, the Association of European Police Colleges (AEPC) and a regional civilian police training institute sponsored and funded by Norway. The South-east European Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges (SEECAP), a joint initiative of NATO's South-east Europe Initiative (SEEI) and the Stability Pact's Working Table III under the umbrella of SEEGROUP, began in early 2001 to bring together ministers of defence and interior in the region on a regular basis to assess threat perceptions. A Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) in Croatia is funded by the German government, while the UK financed a new centre on transparency in military budgeting and planning in Sofia, Bulgaria. The US and Norway finance missions to assess small arms stocks and flows in countries willing to request the service, while the US and Germany finance the destruction of weapons, as in Albania. Even the United Nations Development Programme initiated and funded research on human security in south-eastern Europe by local scholars for its 1999 Human Development Report (Centre for Liberal Strategies 1999). The one aspect to which little attention appears to be given by monitoring authorities, with the partial exception of the international mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the intelligence services.

Are there lessons to be learnt from the Balkans?

There appear to be two basic assumptions behind the extraordinary resources and efforts being invested in security issues, structures and reform in south-eastern Europe. The first is that the democratic peace hypothesis – that democracies do not go to war against each other – should guide post-conflict reconstruction in the war-torn and war-vulnerable area. Democratic governance, it is assumed, will end the proclivity to war and make peace sustainable. The second is that civilian and democratic control over the security apparatus will make it serve the interests of citizens – not of states, as under authoritarian regimes. If the demand for security and the allocation of citizens' taxes more generally across various items of public expenditure and investment reflect citizens' preferences and listing of priorities, then people's universal desire for improved standards of living – 'butter over guns' – will also reduce the incidence of war, the size of military budgets and the abuse of human rights.

In the case of south-eastern Europe, however, the first assumption, that external security will be produced by internal reforms, was turned on its head in the 1980s and 1990s. The severe conflicts of interest over internal reforms led, in a context of external insecurity and change that gave opportunity to some and increased perceptions of threat to national security and survival for others, to secession, war and new state formation legitimised as national defence. Moreover, international response to the resulting violence was to help build up some old and create some new armies, to negotiate with those who had chosen violence and controlled arms, and not to assist in resolving border disputes by negotiation but either to declare such disputes illegitimate or to use military means itself to support some and oppose others who sought changes through war. To reverse this dynamic in post-war conditions requires addressing the symbolic importance of armies, as national heroes, and the perception of external threat as a key element of the new national ideologies. Without addressing the external environment in which the countries of the region undertake reforms, those reforms and public debate about them will remain hostage to a domestic political dynamic in which views about a strong military and military responses to internal conflicts become signifiers of national loyalty or treason.

No external programme of assistance, or demand for reform as a condition of assistance or membership in broader security organisations, thus far addresses this need. All focus on internal reforms and bilateral

relations, treating each country separately without considering its regional context of insecurity and assuming that the weakening of the Cold War's justification for militarised security in the West applied to the Balkans automatically. There is one exception. The concept of the Stability Pact, and related efforts such as SECI and SEEGROUP, focus on cooperation across borders in the region on the assumption that such cooperation will reduce mutual hostilities. But this approach makes a similar mistake, assuming that the interstate relations in Western Europe after the Second World War apply to the Balkans now. This is to ignore the very real threats that remain, including some created by outsiders (as in the effect of Western policy toward Kosovo on its neighbours, starting with Macedonia, or continuing Greek hostility towards Macedonian statehood). It also ignores the fact that each country perceives such demands for cooperation with neighbours as a profound threat because such cooperation appears to be made as a *precondition* of membership of the EU and NATO. The one goal on which every reform government is basing its entire strategy for domestic change, eventual acceptance by Brussels, becomes dependent on a condition over which they have only partial control – their own willingness to cooperate but not that of their neighbours.⁴ As for internal reforms that provoke further threats of secession and border change, like those that began in Macedonia and Yugoslavia in 2001 (or those not yet definitively settled in Romania, Moldova and Bosnia-Herzegovina), they can only be undertaken in a context of external guarantees of territorial and state integrity that have not been forthcoming. In other words, the 'democratic peace' thesis has unspoken preconditions.

The second assumption of democratic governance, moreover, is not being allowed to operate in much of south-eastern Europe. The demand, financing and mechanisms of accountability for security sector reform are all coming from outside the countries and the region. Instead of turning authoritarian regimes, in which security is for the state and the regime, into democratic regimes in which security is the right of the citizens, the myriad reforms and programmes in south-eastern Europe are aimed at providing security for Western European states and citizens in defence *against* south-eastern Europe. The *interest* in security sector reform is, first, that of Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO, OSCE, the EU) and international organisations and norms (UN peacekeeping, the international human rights regime in the case of ICTY, the World Bank) in their process of adapting to the new international conditions since the end of the Cold War – a process of *their* reform played out in the context of south-eastern Europe – and, second, that of Western European

populations angered at illegal migration, asylum seekers, and traffickers in heroin, women, and children threatening *their* standards of living. The anti-terrorist campaign after 11 September 2001 intensified this focus on the Balkans. The disembodied character of these many programmes, a result of their foreign provenance, is exacerbated, moreover, by their sectoral focus and design. Can such an approach reduce the causes of war and the externalities (in organised crime, refugees, or trafficking in illicit goods and in persons) of regional instability? The lessons of the Yugoslav wars suggest the opposite.

Returning to the three tensions that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia, it becomes clear that it is not military expenditures or armies that cause wars, or even huge stockpiles of armaments and military equipment, but fundamental disagreements over issues of state, constitution and property that make people willing to fight, and the absence of procedures (internationally as well as domestically) and/or freedom to manage these divisive issues democratically. The profound differences in former Yugoslavia were caused by externally imposed conditions regarding economic and political reform in exchange for assistance and the conditions of national survival. The same conditions and reforms are now being required of the new states and regimes in the area, and in far more difficult circumstances. There is no more freedom to debate public policies on such conditions than before, despite democratic governance. All the burden lies, therefore, on the mechanisms and procedures available for accepting and managing the conflicts these conditions produce. Only a socially inclusive, public dialogue about strategic choices and priorities for the whole country at a time of difficult transformation can hope to staunch the destructive potential. The issues to be debated are economic liberalisation and its costs; constitutional reform and the balance between strong executive central power and simultaneous decentralisation to heed demands for autonomy or federalisation; and the costs and consequences of NATO membership if pursued as a substitute for debate about the role of the army and the kind of security policy appropriate to new conditions.

An additional consequence of foreign-driven demand, however, is the increasing sense of helplessness and impotence among citizens throughout the region. This is most palpable where external actors are most present, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and recently Macedonia, but it is also revealed in the reactive posture of most political activity around such issues. It is here that the lesson of South Africa is vital. The posited benefits of democratic governance in regard to security questions do not come from any democratisation process but from special

conditions. In south-eastern Europe, the case of Serbia since the democratic elections of September and December 2000 that replaced Slobodan Milošević and his ruling coalition may be generating the germ of those special conditions.

Western policy toward Serbia from the very beginning of the Yugoslav collapse in the spring of 1991 was extremely influential, not because it supported reform but because it hounded the regime, its policies and security forces. Milošević's creation of a fortress state – one that wore increasingly away at the professional qualities of the Yugoslav army inherited from the communist period, that more than tripled the communist-era size of the internal security police (MUP) to 140,000, that indulged an explosion of armed paramilitaries (estimated at 8,000 still active in early 2001) tied to political parties and organised criminal gangs, and that, like Tudjman's Croatia, increasingly turned élite units of the security forces⁵ into internal occupying armies – was made possible by and in many ways motivated by Western policies of isolation, punishment and rising threats of military action.

Perhaps because of Western policies, including a NATO war against the country, the new government in Belgrade seemed in its first six months to be asserting far greater independence than seen anywhere else in the region in defining its own policies, goals and interests, and in encouraging its citizens to debate public priorities and war guilt, while participating in designing social programmes for a democratic future. Quite early, officials began discussions about membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, to the astonishment of many and amidst expectation that both the army and large segments of the public would adamantly oppose this initiative. Simultaneously, though, non-governmental and semi-governmental institutes and organisations also began to debate future security policy and to initiate programmes of security sector reform independently. Pressure from non-governmental organisations to shorten mandatory military service to six months was sufficient by January 2001 to force the army general staff to agree and to begin work on a better system of conscription. As in South Africa, a sharp reversal in external conditions, an opposition movement that had to act in largely hostile external conditions and thus to define its own path to power (including an ability to take advantage when events moved in its favour), an electoral change in government that reflected a virtual social revolution (extending to elements of the security apparatus), and people in the new government who had themselves come out of an armed movement (South Africa) or the army and police (Serbia), seemed in the first year to be generating a domestically driven process of reform.

The causal arrow between foreign and domestic action was also reversed in Yugoslav foreign policy. The political change was having a strikingly rapid effect on relations with neighbours – replacing hostile confrontation with agreements on recognition and cooperation almost immediately, and changing fundamentally the behaviour of the army when it had to respond to a military threat to Serbian territory (from Albanian nationalist guerrillas in southern Serbia) between the autumn of 2000 and the following spring. Far, however, from illustrating the rationale of security sector reform – that making armies accountable to democratic, civilian authority will make them behave professionally – the new Yugoslav and Serbian governments used the threat in southern Serbia to create the nucleus of an entirely new army and to harmonise military action with other elements of national policy. The deployment in southern Serbia combined professional infantry, mass media, political negotiations, anti-terrorist units and police operations, all under a civilian government minister, Nebojša Čović, working closely with the commanding army general, General Krstić.⁶

Nonetheless, the unresolved issue over the political status of Kosovo and the growing threat from Albanian guerrillas in Serbia itself could also prevent the more sweeping kind of change in priorities and efforts at demilitarising state, economy and society that occurred in South Africa. Popular anger over the Kosovo issue and the abused rights of Serbs in Kosovo was revived after it seemed clean off the public agenda. Then, demands from ICTY for the extradition of Slobodan Milošević to The Hague and for the transfer of other indicted war criminals created an even greater governmental crisis than in Croatia, leading to the collapse of the federal government (when the Montenegrin half withdrew in protest) and an end to the agreement to keep the anti-Milošević ruling coalition together and personal rivalries at bay for the first two years.

Finally, the dominance of Western interests over local interests in shaping the demand for security sector reform in south-eastern Europe goes so far as to deny the declared interests of the region's citizens. If public opinion polls are to be trusted, it is not externally directed threats or unreformed militaries and police but weak states unable to provide internal security and some protection against the profound insecurities of economic transformation and collapse (such as high unemployment, inflation and capsized welfare systems) that most concern citizens in south-eastern Europe. Indeed, the 'social question', meaning the consequences of the jettisoned welfare systems of socialism and the external requirements for downsizing public bureaucracies and enterprises, defines most people's concept of security. It is the primary cause of organised

crime and the insecurities it generates. The welfare question has transformed militaries increasingly into political pressure groups aiming like unions to protect soldiers from unemployment, as mentioned above. Democratic governments must be responsive to such discontent.

The result thus far in conditions of achingly high unemployment and widespread poverty is to defeat the purpose of security sector reforms where demobilisation and downsizing only divert former soldiers into other forms of public employment for which they are not trained or could possibly be dangerous, such as new border services or community police forces. Moreover, this is only the beginning. According to recent estimates, in the former Yugoslavia alone, two million persons out of a labour force of seven million were employed in defence sector activities (reportedly at least 200,000 in Serbia in 2001; in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war, 40,000 were directly employed in military industries, and 40–55 per cent of the Bosnian economy was engaged in some way in the defence sector). The conversion of such industries requires massive new capital that shows little sign of materialising in the next ten years. As long as citizens seek other avenues of safety and survival than political action or even 'non-governmental' activity, the vicious circle with which this article began is reinforced.

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Notes

- 1 See the chapter in this volume by Mary Kaldor for more detailed discussion.
- 2 See the excellent survey in Hansen 2001.
- 3 Information on the activities, meetings and projects of Working Table III is available on the Stability Pact website: www.stabilitypact.org. A discussion of the status of Working Table III in June 2001 can be found in Woodward 2001.
- 4 In 2000 the Bulgarian parliament demanded the government pull out of the Stability Pact for this reason. The government refused, but risked a crisis in doing so.
- 5 In the case of Croatia, the *Gardijske Brigade* under Tudjman's personal control.
- 6 I am grateful to Dušan Janjić for this information. Although this experiment could be the germ of an entirely new army, an analysis in January 2001 by journalists of the Alternative Information Network argued that 'civilian control of defence matters and joining the system of collective security could show that the crisis in the security zone towards Kosovo and Metohija is the smallest problem the Yugoslav army will have to put up with in the near future' (AIM Belgrade: 2001).

IV

Conclusion